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Article
Culture, Dissent, and the State: The Example of
Commonwealth African Marriage Law
Johanna E. Bondt
This is an explosive time for those seeking to define the meaning and
parameters of marriage. The subject has generated heated debate
worldwide. In June 2010, the European Court of Human Rights declined
to extend marriage rights to a gay Austrian couple, but the Court carefully
laid the foundation for the recognition of such rights when a European
consensus on the issue emerges. In July 2010, Argentina extended to
same-sex couples the right to marry, joining nine other countries that
legally recognize same-sex couples' right to marry. In August 2010, a
United States district judge struck down a California ban on same-sex
marriage. Marriage, as a legal status and a social construct, continues to
evolve.
In recent years, some theorists have questioned the continued salience of
marriage as a legal category and advocated a minimal role for the state in
marriage regulation. Those challenging marriage as an institution and the
state's role in marriage regulation do so for legitimate and compelling
reasons, primarily related to the role of the institution in perpetuating
sexism and heterosexism. This Article is the first to explore the
transnational applicability of this critique of marriage. In light of this
critique, the Article interrogates the role of the state in marriage regulation
in the particular context of Commonwealth African states. In contrast to
those arguing for a limited or nonexistent role for the state in the ordering
of private, intimate relationships, the Article argues strongly for expanded,
rather than reduced, state intervention in marriage. Robust state
regulation will promote equality within individual relationships and
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among relationships, including same-sex relationships.
The Article proposes a three-part strategy for promoting equality in
marriage. First, states with plural legal systems, such as those in
Commonwealth Africa, should preserve the plural legal architecture of
marriage but integrate the relevant laws by establishing a legislative core
of rights within marriage. Second, states should promote equality among
intimate relationships by building on the existing marriage "menu"
options, adding options for same-sex couples when the political climate is
ripe for such reform. Third, states should explore traditions and
customary law that support broader understandings of family and
caregiving, moving the focus offamily law beyond the heterosexual spousal
dyad.
INTRODUCTION
Marriage matters. In recent years, activists and scholars from all over
the world have challenged the traditional parameters of marriage,
questioning eligibility requirements and legal benefits that arise from
marriage.' Some advocate for the elimination of marriage as a legal status
while others argue for the expansion of marriage rights to same-sex
couples. 2 Both proposals have generated significant controversy and called
into question the role of the state in marriage regulation. A number of
theorists in the global North argue that reducing the state's role in marriage
regulation, or eliminating it altogether, will promote equality for women
and same-sex couples. This Article is the first to explore the transnational
application of these important theoretical contributions. The Article
assesses the role of the state in marriage regulation in the context of
Commonwealth African states and concludes that robust state intervention
in marriage has the greatest potential to promote equality within and
among families.
1. Dorian Solot & Marshall Miller, Taking Government Out of the Marriage Business, in
MARRIAGE PROPOSALS: QUESTIONING A LEGAL STATUS 70,71 (Anita Bernstein ed., 2006) ("[Tihe
state acts as a hands-off licensing bureau and divorce granter, making marriage relatively easy
to enter and exit, yet maintaining legal marital status as a key determinant of eligibility for
more than one thousand federal rights and obligations. Cultural lag in family law leaves other
kinds of family relationships dangerously ignored and penalized.").
2. See, e.g., Martha Albertson Fineman, The Meaning of Marriage, in MARRIAGE PROPOSALS,
supra note 1, at 29; Samuel A. Marcosson, Multiplicities of Subordination: The Challenge of Real
Inter-Group Conflicts of Interest, 71 UMKC L. REv. 459, 460 (2002) ("WThere has been an active
campaign by LGBT activists to expand the institution of civil marriage to include equal
recognition of the marriages between same-sex partners."); Summer L. Nastich, Questioning the
Marriage Assumptions: The Justifications for "Opposite-Sex Only" Marriage as Support for the
Abolition of Marriage, 21 LAW & INEQ. 114, 132 (2003) ("Abolishing marriage, however, is a
meritorious means to a just end. Viewed in light of the struggle for [] equal rights . ., abolition
of the legal institution of marriage equalizes these members of society in ways that same-sex
marriages and 'civil unions' will not.").
2
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For the vast majority of women in Commonwealth Africa,3 marriage
determines social acceptance, financial well-being, and even physical
health.4 Despite the centrality of the institution, women enjoy vastly
different rights within marriage depending upon whether the couple
marries according to statutory law, customary law, or religious law.5 The
level of state intervention in marriage depends, in large part, on the type of
marriage into which a couple has entered.6 Civil or statutory marriage
suggests a high level of state control while the state cedes to local
communities much regulatory control over customary and religious
marriages.
Although some feminists have recently argued that the state should not
be involved in the regulation or promotion of marriage, the state has a
critical role to play in the protection of women's rights within marriage.
The state has an obligation to promote equality both within and among
intimate relationships.7 The state's obligation to promote equality within
relationships involves the promotion of gender equality within individual
relationships. The obligation to promote equality across or among
relationships concerns the state's exclusion of certain types of relationships,
such as same-sex relationships, from state recognition. In the
Commonwealth African context, this dual obligation is best served not by
less regulation, as some would argue - but by more.
This Article provides an overview of marriage in Commonwealth
African countries, explores the underlying values that animate reform of
the plural legal systems in these countries, and offers a justification for
contemporary state intervention in the customary marriage regime. The
Article explores the argument of some Western feminists that the role of the
state in marriage regulation is obsolete and considers the saliency of this
3. The African countries in the Commonwealth include: Botswana, Cameroon, The
Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria,
Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe
(although Zimbabwe withdrew in 2003). Although it does not share the same colonial history,
Mozambique was included in the Commonwealth as a "special case." See Member States,
COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT, http://www.thecommonwealth.org/Internal/191086
/142227/members/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2011). This broad array of countries varies in history,
laws, cultures, languages, economics, and politics, to name a few. Although these differences
make generalizations difficult, most of the countries share some characteristics in terms of the
interaction between statutory law and customary law in the marriage context.
4. See generally VOICES OF AFRICAN WOMEN: WOMEN'S RIGHTS IN GHANA, UGANDA, AND
TANZANIA (Johanna Bond ed., 2005).
5. See generally Jeanmarie Fenrich & Tracy E. Higgins, Promise Unfidfilled: Law, Culture, and
Women's Inheritance Rights in Ghana, 25 FORD1HAM INT'L L. J. 259 (2001).
6. See Catherine A. Hardee, Balancing Acts: The Rights of Women and Cultural Minorities in
Kenyan Marital Law, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 712, 721 (2004) ("Each type of marriage is different with
respect to the amount of control the national government exerts in defining both the substance
and procedures of the marriage contract.").
7. This Article builds upon the theoretical contributions of Linda McLain and others who
have characterized the state's responsibility as involving equality promotion both within and
across intimate relationships. See Linda C. McClain, Intimate Affiliation and Democracy: Beyond
Marriage?, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 379, 383 (2003).
8. See, e.g., TAMARA METZ, UNTYING THE KNOT (2010); Fineman, supra note 2, at 29.
32011]
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contention within the plural legal systems of Commonwealth Africa.
Although these arguments are an important and compelling part of the
discourse on women's and LGBT rights in the global North, they are less
persuasive in the particular context of Commonwealth Africa.
Part I of this Article identifies the characteristics of Commonwealth
African marriage within plural legal systems, including rights to enter into
marriage, rights within marriage, and rights at dissolution of marriage.
This description of the contours of marriage provides a backdrop against
which to measure the intransigence of gender roles and to assess the state's
role in challenging and transforming those roles. I do not intend to
describe Commonwealth African marriage in great detail here. To do so
would be impossible given the myriad variations on customary, religious,
and even statutory marriage laws. Customary marriage law, for example,
varies not only within countries but also among ethnic groups and even, at
times, among villages.9 My goal in this section is rather to sketch the
parameters of marriage under different marriage regimes, primarily
customary and statutory law. Although marriage under religious law,
including Islamic and Hindu laws, forms an important part of the marriage
mosaic in Commonwealth Africa, this Article focuses largely on
comparisons between customary and statutory marriage.10 This section
highlights the ways in which customary marriage law discriminates against
women."
Part II explores the values that have shaped the evolution of marriage
law within plural legal systems, including the impact of colonialism, the
desire to preserve culture and tradition, the desire to promote women's
equality within the family, and the recognition of choice in governing
marriage law. As I have argued elsewhere, the discourse on gender
equality in the region must engage both the promotion of equality rights
and the preservation of custom.12 These dominant frames provide the
9. See, e.g., Ephraim N. Ngwafor, Cameroon: The Law Across the Bridge: Twenty Years (1972-
1992) of Confusion, 26 REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT 69, 75-76 (1995) ("Although there is some
resemblance in these various tribes, each tribe has a unique set of customary laws."); Abby
Morrow Richardson, Women's Inheritance Rights in Africa: The Need to Integrate Cultural
Understanding and Legal Reform, HUM. RTS. BRIEF, Winter 2004, at 19, 20 ("Customary law and
practices vary from tribe to tribe, and also within tribes, but are largely based on similar social
principles.").
10. For more information regarding marriage under Islamic law within the region, see 2
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WOMEN & ISLAMIC CULTURES (Suad Joseph et al. eds., 2005); WOMEN'S
RIGHTS & ISLAMIC FAMILY LAW: PERSPECTIVES ON REFORM (Lynn Welchman ed., 2004).
11. See, e.g., Chuma Himonga, Transforming Customary Law of Marriage in South Africa and
the Challenges of Implementation with Specific Reference to Matrimonial Property, 32 INT'L J. LEGAL
INFo. 260, 262-263 (2004) ("[Mjuch of customary law, including the law of marriage, is riddled
with rules and practices that discriminate especially against women.").
12. See Johanna E. Bond, Constitutional Exclusion and Gender in Commonwealth Africa, 31
FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 289 (2008) [hereinafter Bond, Constitutional Exclusion]; Bond, Gender,
Discourse, and Customary Law in Africa, 83 S. CAL. L. REv. 509 (2010) [ hereinafter Bond, Gender,
Discourse]; see also Penelope E. Andrews, Who's Afraid of Polygamy? Exploring the Boundaries of
Family, Equality and Custom in South Africa, 2009 UTAH L. REv. 351, 354 (2009); David Pimentel,
Legal Pluralism in Post-Colonial Africa: Linking Customary and Statutory Adjudication in
4
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foundation for any discussion of women's rights within the family in
Commonwealth Africa.
Part II also interrogates the plural legal system as a possible site for the
exercise of women's agency in the choice of governing marriage law.
Within the plural legal systems of Commonwealth Africa, statutory
marriage regimes can offer women a more equitable, though imperfect,
alternative to the relevant customary or religious marriage law.13 Within
these plural systems, women have the option to marry according to
statutory law, an option that allows some women to exercise agency in
protecting their own rights within the marital relationship.14 Eliminating
the state's role in marriage or eliminating marriage as a legal category in the
Commonwealth African context would simply narrow the range of
marriage options for women. Given the entrenched attachment to marriage
in the region, rates of customary marriage would rise, reducing the
opportunity for women to choose a marital regime that is more hospitable
to women's rights while preserving traditional notions of marriage. By
offering a civil law alternative to traditional marriage, the state plays a
crucial role in protecting the exercise of women's agency in the choice of
governing marriage law. Although the patriarchal social context of the
family constrains women's ability to exercise that choice, the existence of a
more equitable statutory alternative to traditional, customary marriage also
serves an expressive function. The statutory alternative, even if selected by
a minority of marrying couples in the region, expresses the state's
normative commitment to women's rights within the family.
In Part III of the Article, I advocate preserving a role for the state in
marriage regulation in Commonwealth Africa on two primary grounds.
First, the state has an obligation to promote gender equality within
relationships.15 The state must take seriously its international human rights
obligations to intervene in marriage. Abrogation of the state's role in
marriage regulation would, in fact, contravene human rights obligations.
Article 16 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), for example, requires States
parties to actively engage in the promotion of equality within marriage.16 It
would be impossible for a state to fulfill this obligation if it abdicated
responsibility over marriage regulation or constructed a minimal role for
Mozambique, 14 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEv. L.J. 59 (2011).
13. See EUNICE M. IIPINGE & DEBIE LEBEAU, BEYOND INEQUALITIES 2005: WOMEN IN NAMIBIA
10 (2005) ("The Married Persons' Equality Act (No. 1 of 1996) specifies equality of persons
within marriage and does away with the legal definition of the man as head of the house. . . .
However, the Act only covers couples married under civil law . . .").
14. A woman's ability to exercise this agency, however, is constrained by the patriarchal
social context of the family. See infra notes 261-66 and accompanying text.
15. For one state's approach to the promotion of equality within relationships, see LAW
COMM'N OF CAN., BEYOND CONJUGALITY 122 (2001); see also Linda C. McClain, WhVlat Place for
Marriage (E)quality in Marriage Promotion?, in MARRIAGE PROPOSALS, supra note 1, at 106, 107.
16. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, art.
16, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, 18 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981) [hereinafter CEDAW].
2011] 5
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state intervention within marriage.
Second, the state has a role to play in the protection of equality across
relationships. To this end, the state must protect not only heterosexual
unions but those in same-sex relationships as well.1 ' The global landscape
of rights protection across relationships is evolving. In June 2010, the
European Court of Human Rights issued a judgment stating that the
Austrian government was not required to extend marriage rights to same-
sex couples. Importantly, however, the Court indicated that it might
someday require that states recognize the marriage rights of same-sex
couples if and when a European consensus emerges.18 In a surprising
development in July 2010, Argentina, a majority-Catholic country,
recognized same-sex couples' right to marry.19 Argentina joins Belgium,
Canada, Iceland, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, South Africa, Spain,
and Sweden in legally recognizing the marriage rights of same-sex
couples.20 In August 2010, a federal judge in the United States struck down
a California law banning same-sex marriage.21 A number of other countries
across the globe fall short of providing marriage rights but extend
protection to civil partnerships or other forms of same-sex unions.22
Despite the nascent trend toward state recognition of marriage rights
for same-sex couples, feminists and LGBT activists are divided as to
whether to embrace or reject marriage as an institution.-3 In this context, a
17. See THE YOGYAKARTA PRINCIPLES, Principle 24 (2007),
http://www.yogyakartaprinciples.org/principles-en.pdf ("States shall ... [t]ake all necessary
legislative, administrative and other measures to ensure that in States that recognise same-sex
marriages or registered partnerships, any entitlement, privilege, obligation or benefit available
to different-sex married or registered partners is equally available to same-sex married or
registered partners. . . ."); see generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., A History of Same-Sex Marriage,
79 VA. L. REV. 1419 (1993) (providing an overview of the history of same-sex marriage).
18. Schalk v. Austria, App. No. 30141/04, 11 46, 58 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 24, 2010), available
at http://www.menschenrechte.ac.at/uploads/media/Schalk.undKopf ggOEsterreich
Urteil_01.pdf ("In the absence of consensus, the State enjoyed a particularly wide margin of
appreciation.... [T~he Court notes that there is no European consensus regarding same-sex
marriage.").
19. Luisita Lopez Torregrosa, In Latin America, a Harbinger of Women's Rights, N.Y. TIMES,
(July 27, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/28/world/americas/28iht-letter.html
(observing that "Argentina's recent turbulent past and brutal oppression and persecution of
gays and lesbians hardly foreshadowed the Patagonian nation's new global status as a
champion for them.").
20. Q&A: Argentina Gay Marriage Law, BBC NEWS (July 15, 2010),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-10650267.
21. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010), argued, No. 10-16751
(9th Cir. Dec. 6, 2010) (holding that a voter-enacted state constitutional amendment restricting
marriage to one man and one woman violated the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution).
22. See, e.g., Elizabeth Burleson, From Nondiscrimination to Civil Marriage, 19 CORNELL J. L. &
PUB. POL'Y 383, 394-96 (2010).
23. Fineman, supra note 2, at 29 (arguing for the abolition of marriage as a legal status and
leaving marriage to the realm of private contract); McClain, supra note 15, at 106 (supporting a
movement to expand marriage beyond the traditional definition of one man and one woman,
recogruzing same-sex marriage as well as other family arrangements); Mary Lyndon Shanley,
The State of Marriage and the State in Marriage, in MARRIAGE PROPOSALS, supra note 1, at 188, 188
(asserting that the state has a legitimate role in arbitrating committed adult relationships);
6
[Vol. 14
HeinOnline  -- 14 Yale Hum. Rts. & Dev. L.J. 6 2011
Culture, Dissent, and the State
number of feminists and LGBT advocates argue that the state should not
privilege marriage over other types of familial relationships. 24 Although
some LGBT advocates argue for the extension of marital privileges to those
in same-sex relationships, others argue for dismantling the institution of
marriage as a way to promote equality for women and same-sex couples.25
Advocates of marriage deregulation suggest relegating the ordering of
intimate relationships to ordinary contract law or constructing a system in
which the state can register all manner of familial relationships and reward
or compensate, for example, those who engage in caretaking.26 This
method avoids the use of a rather blunt instrument (i.e. formal marriage) as
a proxy for behavior that the state would like to incentivize. 27 There are
limitations, however, on the application of marriage deregulation in
Commonwealth Africa. The arguments advanced by feminists and LGBT
advocates in the global North are highly contextual. The arguments,
compelling in their own context, are products of a geographic, political, and
temporal reality that is not readily transferable to Commonwealth Africa.
In Part IV, the Article proposes several ways in which a
Commonwealth African state might positively intervene in marriage,
promoting equality both within and across relationships. Abolishing
customary marriage systems is neither culturally sensitive nor feasible.
Recognizing the continued purchase of customary marriage in the region,
states should establish a "legislative floor" for marriage rights that applies
regardless of the type of marriage into which a couple has entered. The
"legislative floor" approach would standardize a minimum core of rights
within marriage, such as minimum age, consent, property rights, and
custody. The state would preserve aspects of customary marriage law that
are valued markers of community and ethnic identity and that do not
contravene the statutory standard of minimum rights within marriage. A
"legislative floor" approach will allow states to preserve the positive
aspects of customary and religious marriage law while reducing its
discriminatory aspects.28
Claudia Card, Against Marriage and Motherhood, 11 HYPATIA 1 (1996) (arguing that the
institution of marriage is flawed and should be abolished rather than expanded to include
same-sex couples).
24. Fineman, supra note 2, at 40 ("If we are concerned with dependency and want to
ensure caretaking through social and economic subsidy of family, then why not focus on the
relationship of caretaker and dependent? It is not necessary to support this unit indirectly
through marriage when we can do so directly with policies that address the caretaker-
dependent relationship.").
25. See Shanley, supra note 23, at 188-189.
26. Solot & Miller, supra note 1, at 76 ("Broadly defining 'family' to include not only blood,
marriage, and adoptive relationships but also others who operate as caretakers in a significant
way on a long-term basis protects both the vulnerable and the caretakers .... ").
27. See Vivian Hamilton, Mistaking Marriage for Social Policy, 11 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 307,
309 (2004) ("Marriage is proposed and accepted (so to speak) by lawmakers as a proxy for
socially desirable outcomes.").
28. See generally Bond, Gender, Discourse, supra note 12 (discussing the importance of
promoting equality while preserving the positive aspects of culture).
72011]
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Rather than eliminating customary or religious marriage law in favor of
a universal statutory option, the "legislative floor" approach maintains a
plural system in which marrying couples select the governing law.
Standardization of rights through a "legislative floor" approach will allow
states to build upon the plural system and eventually increase the menu of
options available for marriage. Removing the state from the marriage
business would effectively reduce menu options by eliminating the state-
sponsored statutory version of marriage. States should preserve the
architecture of the plural system and, when politically feasible, increase the
menu options to include civil partnerships or marriage for same-sex
couples. Although distinct in its culture, politics, history, and economic
status, South Africa provides a regional example of a country that has
increased its menu of marriage options to include not only civil, customary,
and religious marriage but also civil partnerships and marriage for same-
sex couples.29
Finally, states should explore areas of potential resonance between
state-sanctioned values of gender equality and customary law within
marriage. Customary law is dynamic; in theory, it will respond to evolving
social needs and pressures.30 There may be ways in which customary
notions of caregiving support a broader understanding of marriage and
familial roles. Caretaking responsibilities, for example, have traditionally
extended beyond the spousal dyad to include extended family members.31
HIV/AIDS has left a startling number of children in the region without
parental caregivers, leaving them in the hands of grandmothers and other
extended family members.32 This de-centering of the spousal relationship
within customary understandings of family may allow for an exploration of
resonance between custom and contemporary critiques of the state's
privileging of individualistic, heterosexual marriage partners.
The Article strongly argues for preserving a role for the state in
marriage regulation within Commonwealth Africa. This conclusion stems,
in part, from the recognition that eliminating the role of the
Commonwealth African state in marriage regulation would do more harm
than good. In this sense, the transnational applicability of the marriage
critique is limited. Feminist arguments to the contrary, although important
29. See infra notes 386-94 and accompanying text.
30. See Alice Armstrong et al., Uncovering Reality: Excavating Women's Rights in African
Family Law, 7 INT'L J. L. & FAM. 314,327 (1993).
31. Michael J. Higdon, When Informal Adoption Meets Intestate Succession: The Cultural
Myopia of the Equitable Adoption Doctrine, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 232 (2008) ("[The costs
of child rearing in the extended family model of West Africa are 'rarely born exclusively by
biological parents; rather, they are shared by many people through the extended family and
other social networks."' (quoting Rebecca L. Hegard & Maria Scannapieco, Grandma's Babies:
The Problem of Welfare Eligibility for Children Raised by Relatives, 27 J. Soc. & Soc. WELFARE 153,
155 (2000)).
32. Jonathan Todres, Rights Relationships and the Experience of Children Orphaned by AIDS, 41
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 417, 447 (2007) (noting that "[ejnsuring that orphans have alternative family
care arrangements (either through extended family or a state designated guardian) is an
essential initial step to ensuring the well-being of the child following the loss of parents").
8 [Vol. 14
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and compelling in many jurisdictions, do not reflect the current reality of
Commonwealth African women's lives. In this context, the state has a
crucial role to play in promoting equality within and across marital
relationships. Although contemporary political realities in the region
suggest some limits on the state's ability to promote equality across
relationships, there is considerable value in laying the foundation for future
advocacy efforts. Indeed, rather than echoing Western feminists' concerns
about state overreaching and intrusiveness in marriage, many African
scholars lament the enervated state response to persistent inequality within
and across intimate, familial relationships.33
I. CHARACTERISTICS OF AFRICAN MARRIAGE
A. Requirements for Marriage
1. Consent and Age Requirements
Marriage under African customary law is often seen as the union
between two families rather than two individuals.3 4 As such, the customary
law of some ethnic groups does not require the individual consent of the
marrying woman.35 In many countries, customary law considers women to
be under the guardianship of their fathers before marriage and of their
husbands after marriage.36 A widow may live under the guardianship of
her husband's customary law heir, such as her husband's brother or a male
33. See, e.g., Jacqueline Asiimwe, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: The Women's Movement
and Law Reform in Uganda from 1985-2000, in VOICES OF AFRICAN WOMEN, supra note 4, at 52, 60
("The government fears rocking the cultural boat and would rather sacrifice women at the
altar of archaic and discriminatory laws."); Muna Ndulo, The Changing Nature of Customary
Marriage in Zambia, in WOMEN AND LAW IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 3, 17 (Cynthia Grant
Bowman & Akua Kuenyehia eds., 2003) ("In Zambia little attention has been given to the
future of customary law by the government hitherto.... There is an urgent need to study this
problem and plot a course for the future of customary marriage law if it is to develop on sound
lines.").
34. See Fitnat Naa-Adjeley Adjetey, Reclaiming the African Woman's Individuality: The
Struggle Between Women's Reproductive Autonomy and African Society and Culture, 44 AM. U. L.
REV. 1351, 1355 (1995) ("Marriage symbolized the uniting of two families and bolstered the
prestige and security of families.").
35. See CHRISTOPHER AMHERST BYUMA ZIGLRA, RELIGION, CULTURE AND GENDER: A STUDY
OF WOMEN'S SEARCH FOR GENDER EQUALITY IN SWAZILAND 79 (2003) ("A man could marry a
young girl without her consent through arranged marriage, kwendzisa, which only required
mutual agreement of the two families rather than the two persons concerned."); MERCY SIAME
ET AL., BEYOND INEQUALITiES: WOMEN IN ZAMBIA 35 (1998) ("In customary marriage law,
consent between the parties does not include the consent of the bride-to-be."); Karine B6lair,
Unearthing the Customary Law Foundations of "Forced Marriages" During Sierra Leone's Civil War:
The Possible Impact of International Criminal Law on Customary Marriage and Women's Rights in
Post-Conflict Sierra Leone, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 551, 568 (2006) ("While the consent of the
wife's family is necessary for a valid marriage, that of the wife is not. Customary marriage
often takes place when girls are very young. .. ).
36. See, e.g., PULENG LETUKA ET AL., BEYOND INEQUALITIES: WOMEN IN LESOTHO 20 (1997)
("Under the customary law a woman, before marriage, is under the guardianship of her father.
Upon marriage she transfers to that of her husband. .. )
2011] 9
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cousin.37
These limited conceptions of women's legal capacity affect societal
perceptions of women's ability to consent to marriage.38 In other words,
when a woman is considered a legal minor or otherwise lacks legal capacity
under customary and/or statutory law, it becomes less important to seek
her consent in the context of an impending marriage. 39 As a result, families
sometimes coerce or force women and girls into marriages, sometimes with
much older men.40 In addition to explicit familial coercion, social pressure
to marry is significant and acts as a powerful incentive for girls and women
to accept the marriages arranged by their families.41
Under the statutory law of most Commonwealth African countries,
both women and men must explicitly consent to the marriage.42 Nigerian
statutory law, for example, defines marriage as a voluntary contract
37. This is true in patrilineal communities. See id.
38. See Marsha A. Freeman, Measuring Equality: A Comparative Perspective on Women's Legal
Capacity and Constitutional Rights in Five Commonwealth Countries, 5 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L. J.
110, 112-13 (1989) ("Capacity in its more general sense refers to the ability to accept and to
exercise the rights and responsibilities of an adult in one's society. . . . Ultimately, it implies a
full range of choice in one's personal, social, and economic life.").
39. Some countries limit women's ability to enter into contracts and otherwise treat
women as legal minors. See, e.g., U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women, Combined Fifth and Sixth Periodic Reports of States Parties: Kenya, 101, 165,
CEDAW/C/KEN/6 (Oct. 16, 2006) ("Women who are single must obtain their father's consent
to obtain passports whereas those who are married must obtain their husband's consent ...
That is not extended to men in the same situation."). In Lesotho, the law recognizes a
woman's legal capacity if she is over twenty-one years of age and unmarried or if she is a
widow. LETUKA ET AL., supra note 36, at 20.
40. See SARAH C. MVUDUDU ET AL., LOBOLA: ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR WOMEN'S REPRODUCTIVE
RIGHTS IN BOTSWANA, LESOTHO, MALAWI, MOZAMBIQUE, SWAZILAND, ZAMBIA AND ZIMBABWE
27 (2002) ("It is also open to abuse by those who stand to benefit from receiving lobola where
young girls may be forced into early marriages and marriages to older men.").
41. See Margot Lovett, On Power and Powerlessness: Marriage and Political Metaphor in
Colonial Western Tanzania, 27 INT'L J. AFR. HiST. STUD. 273, 289 (1994) ("Pressure [to marry] was
brought to bear on them not only from their own families, but from the wider community as
well.").
42. Typically, statutory marriage law requires the "free and full consent" of both parties to
the marriage, a requirement that is often in conflict with prevailing conceptions of marriage.
Compare U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Initial Reports of
States Parties: Namibia, art. 16.1, CEDAW/C/NAM/1 (Feb. 10, 1997) ("Marriage may be
entered into 'only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses."'), with id. (" Iln
many respects these constitutional mandates are inconsistent with existing law and
practices."). See also SWAZ. CONST. art. 27, § 2 (2005) ("Marriage shall be entered into only with
the free and full consent of the intending spouses."); U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women, Combined Initial, Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Periodic Reports
of States Parties: Sierra Leone, art. 23.2.1, CEDAW/C/SLE/5 (Dec. 14, 2006) ("Under general
law, marriage is a contract and therefore, the parties (i.e. both man and woman) must agree
before the marriage contract is valid."); U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women, Periodic Reports of States Parties: Uganda, art. 16, CEDAW/C/UGA/3 (July 3,
2003) ("Article 31 of the Constitution. . . provides for both men and women to enter marriage
of their own free consent.); U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,
Initial Report of States Parties: Zimbabwe, art. 16.1, CEDAW/C/ZWE/1 (July 20, 1996) ("Without
consent of both spouses a marriage can be annulled."); Mark J. Calaguas et al., Legal Pluralism
and Women's Rights: A Study in Postcolonial Tanzania, 16 CoLUM. J. GENDER & L. 471, 496 (2007)
(discussing the Tanzanian requirement of freely given consent).
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between a man and a woman.43 Although the statute restricts marriage to
opposite-sex couples, it imposes a consent requirement designed to combat
forced or coercive marriage. In addition to statutory consent requirements
applicable to civil marriages, a few countries have enacted legislation
extending the requirements of civil marriage, including consent, to
customary marriages." South Africa's Recognition of Customary Marriages
Act, for example, requires consent of both spouses for legal recognition of
the customary marriage, as well as that of the parents where a party is a
minor.45 In addition, Ghana's criminal code makes it a criminal offense to
force another to marry.46 In some cases, customary law has evolved to
require the consent of both parties. In Ghana, Namibia, and Sierra Leone,
for example, contemporary customary law requires the consent of both
parties to the marriage.47
In some African Commonwealth countries, customary law permits
early marriage.48 Although the marriage may not be consummated until a
girl reaches puberty, families may promise an infant or very young
daughter in marriage.49 Parents sometimes arrange marriages that involve
a young daughter and a much older man.50 This age difference may
reinforce male dominance within the marriage, limiting women's or girls'
ability to negotiate safe sex practices and contributing to violence within
the marriage.51
43. See Andreas Rahmatian, Termination of Marriage in Nigerian Family Laws: The Need for
Reform and the Relevance of the Tanzanian Experience, 10 INT'L J. L. POL'Y & FAM. 281, 290 (1996)
("Statutory marriage in Nigeria is a voluntarily concluded contractual union between one man
and one woman.").
44. See W. TIcHAGWA, BEYOND INEQUALITIES: WOMEN IN ZIMBABWE 45 (1998) (explaining
that intending spouses over the age of eighteen under Zimbabwe's Customary Marriages Act
no longer need parental consent); Calaguas et al., supra note 42, at 496 (discussing the consent
provision in Tanzania's Law of Marriage Act); Himonga, supra note 11, at 264 (noting that in
South Africa, "both parties to the marriage are now required to consent to their marriage.").
45. Himonga, supra note 11, at 264 (2004).
46. Bernice Sam, Discrimination in the Traditional Marriage and Divorce System in Ghana:
Looking at the Problem from a Human Rights Perspective, in VOICES OF AFRICAN WOMEN, supra
note 4, at 205, 206.
47. See id.; see also U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,
Combined Initial, Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Periodic Reports of State Parties: Sierra Leone, art.
23.2.2, CEDAW/C/SLE/5 (Dec. 14, 2006); U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women, Initial Reports of the State Parties: Namibia, art. 16.3, CEDAW/C/NAM/1 (Feb.
10, 1997).
48. See Athena D. Mutua, Gender Equality and Women's Solidarity Across Religious, Ethnic,
and Class Differences in the Kenyan Constitutional Review Process, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L.
1, 27 (2006).
49. See Elizabeth Warner, Behind the Wedding Veil: Child Marriage as a Form of Trafficking in
Girls, 12 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 233, 237 (describing the prevalence and practice of
child marriage internationally and in Africa).
50. According to one women's rights organization in Southern Africa, "From the outset
such relationships involve significant power imbalances from which it is extremely difficult
and rare for a girl to carve out her own autonomy. This places the woman in a position of
subservience with rights no less than those of labourers." MVUDUDU ET AL., supra note 40, at 21.
51. See, e.g., Naana Otoo-Oyortey & Sonita Pobi, Early Marriage and Poverty: Exploring Links
and Key Policy Issues, in GENDER, DEVELOPMENT, AND MARRIAGE 42, 47 (Caroline Sweetman ed.,
2003) ("The unequal power relations that exist between a young bride and her relatively older
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Where early marriage occurs, it often causes serious health
consequences for girls who become pregnant at a young age. 52 Girls
between the ages of ten and fourteen are five to seven times as likely to die
from childbirth as their counterparts who are over twenty years of age.53
One of the primary health risks for girls who marry and become pregnant
at an early age is obstructed labor due to small pelvic bones. Obstructed
labor can result in sepsis, hemorrhage, obstetric fistula, and deathM
Many Commonwealth African countries have enacted legislation to
regulate the age at which individuals may enter into marriage.55 A number
of countries require both boys and girls to be eighteen or older to marry.56
Other countries have different marriage age requirements for boys and
girls. In Tanzania, for example, the Law of Marriage Act, which applies to
statutory, customary, and religious marriages, allows boys to marry at age
eighteen and girls to marry at age fifteen.57 In Uganda, marriage age
and more experienced husband mean that men often have total control over how, when, and
where sexual intercourse takes place.").
52. See Eno-Obong Akpan, Early Marriage in Eastern Nigeria and the Health Consequences of
Vesico-Vaginal Fistulae (VVF) Among Young Mothers, in GENDER, DEVELOPMENT, AND
MARRIAGE, supra note 51, at 70, 73 ("The large majority of VVF sufferers are young (usually
between 12 and 20 years of age), poor, uneducated, rural women whose access to medical
facilities is limited. . . . Typically, the sufferer experiences the damage during prolonged
labour, often caused by a lack of physical maturity on the part of the mother."); Sharon
LaFraniere, Nightmare for African Women: Birthing Injury and Little Help, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28,
2005, at Al.
53. Nawal M. Nour, Health Consequences of Child Marriage in Africa, 12 EMERGING
INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1644,1646 (2006).
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Sixth
Periodic Report of States Parties: Nigeria, art. 101, CEDAW/C/NGA/6 (Oct. 5, 2006) (discussing
Nigeria's Child's Rights Act which "stipulates eighteen years as the minimum age for
marriage and betrothal"); U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,
Combined Second and Third Periodic Reports of States Parties: Namibia, art. 68,
CEDAW/C/NAM/2-3 (Sept. 2,2005) ("The Married Persons Equality Act makes eighteen (18)
years the age of consent for entry into civil marriage for both sexes. . . ."); BENEDITA DA SILVA
ET AL., BEYOND INEQUALITIES 2005: WOMEN IN MOZAMBlQUE 44 (2006) (discussing the new
Family Law, which increases the minimum age of marriage from fifteen for girls and sixteen
for boys to eighteen years for both boys and girls); Esther Damalie Naggita, Why Men Come
Out Ahead: The Legal Regime and the Protection and Realization of Women's Rights in Uganda, 6 E.
AFR. J. PEACE & HUM. RTS. 34, 43 (2000); Manisuli Ssenyonjo, Women's Rights to Equality and
Non-Discrimination: Discriminatory Family Legislation in Uganda and the Role of Uganda's
Constitutional Court, 21 INT'L J.L. POL'Y & FAM. 341, 357 (2007).
56. See U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Sixth Periodic
Report of States Parties: Nigeria, 101, CEDAW/C/NGA/6 (Oct. 5, 2006); U.N. Comm. on the
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Combined Second and Third Periodic Reports of
States Parties: Namibia, art. 68, CEDAW/C/NAM/2-3 (Sept. 2, 2005); U.N. Comm. on the
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Initial Periodic Report of States Parties: Zimbabwe,
art. 60, CEDAW/C/ZWE/1 (July 20, 1996) ("Women over the age of 18 years can now enter
into marriage without the consent of their fathers or guardians and men and women have the
same right to enter into marriage.").
57. See U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Concluding
Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women: United Republic
of Tanzania, art. 146, CEDAW/C/TZA/CO/6 (July 16, 2008) ("While noting that the proposed
amendments to the Marriage Act purports [sici to establish the legal minimum age for both
girls and boys at 18 years instead of 15 years for girls and 18 years for boys as it stands under
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requirements differ under statutory, customary, and religious law.58 In
addition to consent of the spouses, some countries require parental consent,
depending on the age of the spouses. 59 In Ghana, for example, the
Children's Act of 1998 established eighteen as the minimum age for
marriage, but it allows children between sixteen and eighteen years old to
wed with their parents' consent. 60
2. Bridewealth or Lobola
Bridewealth, sometimes called bride price or lobola, is the payment from
a husband's family to a wife's family in recognition of the couple's
marriage.61 Practiced primarily by patrilineal communities, lobola typically
consists of two stages: small, introductory payments that initiate the
marriage process and the "main ceremony where major payments are
made."62
Although the particular requirements for lobola and the name given to
the practice differ among ethnic groups, there are some similarities across
communities. For example, in many communities, lobola represents "the
transfer of a woman's reproductive capacity from her natal family to the
man's family." 63 Indeed, so strong is this connection between lobola and
reproduction that "where the lobola has been paid and there are no children
born of that marriage, traditionally the family of the woman is obliged to
find a replacement for the bride or refund the lobola."64
Over time, the meaning of the custom has changed. It has "lost much
of its traditional and spiritual significance and has become highly
section 13 of the Marriage Act, the Committee is concerned at the delay in passing such
amendment.").
58. Although the civil statute governing marriage stipulates that the parties to the
marriage must be twenty-one years old, the Hindu marriage statute and the Customary
Decree, which regulates customary marriage, require girls to be aged sixteen or over and boys
to be eighteen or over. FAREDA BANDA, WOMEN, LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN AFRICAN
PERSPECIVE 101 (2005). For marriages under Islamic law, there is no minimum age for
marriage and girls as young as nine years old have been married. Id. The Domestic Relations
Bill, which has languished in the Ugandan Parliament on and off for the last thirty-plus years,
would establish eighteen as the minimum age for marriage for both men and women. Mary
Karugaba, Urgently Pass Domestic Relations Bill - Dr. Ntiro, NEW VISION, Jan. 25, 2009,
http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/9/31/669293.
59. See, e.g., U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Third and
Fourth Periodic Reports of States Parties: Zambia, art. 64, CEDAW/C/ZAM/3-4 (Aug. 12, 1999);
U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Initial Report of States
Parties: Zimbabwe, art. 60, CEDAW/C/ZWE/1 (July 20, 1996); Calaguas et al., supra note 42, at
496; Sope Williams, Nigeria, Its Women and International Law: Beyond Rhetoric, 4 HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 229, 239 (2004).
60. Sam, supra note 46, at 206.
61. MVUDUDU ET AL., supra note 40, at 13 (defining lobola as "the process where the family
of the man makes payments to the family of the woman in the process of marriage]").
62. Id.
63. Id. at 15.
64. Id. at 16.
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commercialized . . . ."65 Lobola "is now seen as the purchase of a wife." 66 In
Ghana, "families of prospective brides demand huge sums of money in
addition to other gifts." 67
Under customary law, lobola is often a requirement for a valid
customary marriage.68 In some countries, such as Swaziland, the practice,
while important, is not necessary for a valid customary marriage.69 Within
some ethnic groups in Nigeria and Zambia, on the other hand, lobola is a
prerequisite for a valid customary marriage.70 Similarly, Islamic law
requires a payment from the husband's family. For example, in
Mozambique, mahari (contract money) must be paid to the bride before the
ceremony may occur.7 '
Statutory law does not require the payment of lobola as a prerequisite to
a valid civil marriage.72 However, although not legally required, statutory
law in Tanzania provides for the option of paying bride price. 3 And even
if couples choose to marry under statutory law, they sometimes incorporate
traditional customs such as lobola.74 The persistence of lobola payment, in
65. Id. at 26.
66. Sam, supra note 46, at 212.
67. Id.
68. See U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Initial Reports of
States Parties: Namibia, art. 16.1, CEDAW/C/NAM//1 (Feb. 10, 1997); MVUDUDU ET AL., supra
note 40, at 9; GEORGE 0. NDEGE, CULTURE AND CUSTOMS OF MOZAMBIQUE 80 (2007); Pamela 0.
Davies, Marriage, Divorce, and Inheritance Laws in Sierra Leone and their Discriminatory Effects on
Women, HUM. RTs. BRIEF, Fall 2005, at 17, 19; Tracy E. Higgins et al., Gender Equality and
Customary Marriage: Bargaining in the Shadow of Post-Apartheid Legal Pluralism, 30 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 1653, 1673 (2007).
69. See MVUDUDU ET AL., supra note 40, at 20; TICHAGWA, supra note 44, at 45.
70. See U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Third and
Fourth Periodic Reports of States Parties: Zambia, art. 65, CEDAW/C/ZAM/3-4 (Aug. 12, 1999)
("Payment of lobola is not a legal requirement. However, for marriages under customary law in
patrilineal groups, it is one of the essential elements for establishing the existence of a
marriage."); Rahmatian, supra note 43, at 285.
71. See NDEGE, supra note 68, at 101-02; Naggita, supra note 55, at 45 (explaining that the
Mohammedan Marriage and Divorce Act provides for customary practices, including
payment of mahari).
72. See, e.g., U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Combined
Initial and Second Periodic Reports of States Parties: Mozambique, art. 65, CEDAW/C/MOZ/1-2
(Nov. 14, 2005); U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Initial
Report of States Parties: Zimbabwe, art. 60, CEDAW/C/ZWE/1 (July 20, 1996); SIAME FT AL.,
supra note 35, at 41 ("Ordinance marriage . . . . is validated not by the consent of a woman's
parents and by marriage payments but by compulsory registration and other civil procedures
as stipulated by the Marriage Act.").
73. See U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Concluding
Comments for the Combined Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Periodic Report: United Republic of Tanzania, art.
146, A/63/38 (July 11, 2008).
74. See, e.g., U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Third and
Fourth Periodic Reports of States Parties: Zambia, 65, CEDAW/C/ZAM/3-4 (Aug. 12, 1999)
(noting that "couples married under statutory law still comply with customary marriage
requirements."); U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Initial
Reports of States Parties: Namibia, art. 16.1, CEDAW/C/NAM//1 (Feb. 10, 1997) ("[Clivil
marriages often incorporate customs usually associated with traditional marriage, such as
bride price, thus producing an intertwining of the two systems."); SIAME FT AL., supra note 35,
at 42 ("Payment of lobola is normal in ordinance marriages.").
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both customary and statutory marriages, frustrates some women's rights
activists.75 A number of African feminists and others lament the customary
practice, noting that it contributes to women's subordination within the
family.76 Some feminists have argued that "lobola demeans the status of
women, making them servants, rather than partners, in marriage."77 But
despite calls for the practice's statutory prohibition, lobola continues to play
a significant role in Commonwealth African marriages.
3. Monogamy/Polygamy
Customary law in most Commonwealth African countries allows
polygamy.78 Although polygamy is widespread within many of these
countries, some countries attempt to regulate the practice by requiring legal
registration of customary marriages or by requiring the husband to gain
approval from an existing wife or from the court for subsequent
marriages. 79 For example, in Tanzania, the Law of Marriage Act allows a
first wife to contest a subsequent marriage.80 South Africa requires a party
to apply to the court for approval of polygamous marriage to ease the later
distribution of property.81 As with customary law, Islamic law permits
polygamous marriages. 82 Several countries legally recognize polygamous
75. See, e.g., TANIA FLOOD ET AL., BEYOND INEQUALITIES: WOMEN IN SOUTH AFRICA 31
(1997) (referring to the argument "that lobola demeans the status of women, making them
servants rather than partners in marriage"); Catherine Harries, Daughters of Our Peoples:
International Feminism Meets Ugandan Law and Custom, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 493, 517
(1994) (remarking that "[tihere is currently a movement growing in Uganda, pushed by both
male and female urban Elites, to abolish bride price.").
76. See, e.g., Margaret C. Oguli Oumo, Property in Marriage Relations: Its Legal Implications
for Women in Uganda, in VOICES OF AFRICAN WOMEN, supra note 4, at 243; Sam, supra note 46, at
212.
77. FLOOD ET AL., supra note 75, at 31.
78. See, e.g., U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Combined
Fourth and Fifth Periodic Reports of States Parties: Nigeria, art. 16.3, CEDAW/C/NGA/4-5 (Apr.
28, 2003); U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Initial Report of
States Parties: South Africa, art. 106, CEDAW/C/ZAF/1 (Feb. 25, 1998); ZAKHE HLANZE & LOLO
MKHABELA, BEYOND INEQUALITIES: WOMEN IN SWAZILAND, 34 (1998); IIPINGE & LEBEAU, supra
note 13, at 32; Davies, supra note 68, at 18 ("Under customary law, a man can marry as many
wives as he desires and can afford.").
79. See infra notes 80-81.
80. See Calaguas et al., supra note 42, at 497 ("With regard to polygamous unions, the [Law
of Marriage Act] gives the current wife (or wives) the right to object to additional spouses
under certain circumstances: if the husband is of limited means and the marriage would likely
cause hardship to the family, or if the would-be wife is 'of notoriously bad character,' is
inflicted with a communicable disease, or is 'likely to introduce grave discord into the
household."' (citations omitted)).
81. See Higgins et al., supra note 68, at 1684 (referring to Section 7(6) of South Africa's 1998
Recognition of Customary Marriages Act).
82. See U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Combined
Fourth and Fifth Periodic Reports of States Parties: Nigeria, art. 16.3, CEDAW/C/NGA/4-5 (Apr.
28, 2003); NDEGE, supra note 68, at 79 (" [Piolygyny was accepted and widely practiced among
Moslems and so was the norm . .. across the predominantly Moslem Mozambican society.");
Ssenyonjo, supra note 55, at 349 (" Apart from customary marriages, Ugandan law recognizes
Islamic polygynous marriages. These are governed by the Marriage and Divorce of
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marriages within religious marriage law.83 Islamic law limits a man to no
more than four wives.r
In the majority of Commonwealth African countries, statutory marriage
law prohibits polygamy.85 Despite statutory requirements for monogamy
in civil marriages, some men contract a civil marriage and subsequently
marry additional wives under customary law.86 Ugandan scholar Margaret
Oguli Oumo observes, "Polygamy is a feature in the African family system
and is considered a symbol of wealth.... Polygamy lowers the status of a
wife relative to her husband. . .. The husband becomes the master and his
wives compete for his favors.87
Although most civil marriage statutes prohibit polygamy, it
nevertheless still occurs. In many Commonwealth African countries,
polygamy is common in customary and Islamic marriages. In some
instances, when African feminists have advocated for the abolition of
polygamy, they have encountered vociferous resistance from those who
believe the practice is an important marker of cultural identity.88
4. Regulation of Sexuality
Custom and tradition operate as a mechanism of control over women's
sexuality in the context of marriage.89 Families and communities police the
boundaries of marriage through several forms of social control targeted at
women and girls. The methods of controlling women's sexuality and
reproductive autonomy include, inter alia, female genital mutilation (FGM),
virginity testing, and "curative" or "corrective" rape.
Mohammedans Act.").
83. See U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Second and
Third Periodic Reports of States Parties: Nigeria, 63, CEDAW/C/NGA/2-3 (Feb. 26, 1997) ("Pure
polygamy, that is marriage of two or more wives under Customary or Islamic Law is legal and
recognized."); Ssenyonjo, supra note 55, at 349 ("Apart from customary marriages, Ugandan
law recognizes Islamic polygynous marriages.").
84. See Davies, supra note 68, at 18; Rahmatian, supra note 43, at 286 (noting that "[a] man
has the right to marry up to four women if he is able to treat them with perfect equality").
85. See, e.g., U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Concluding
Comments of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women: Mozambique, art.
22, CEDAW/C/MOZCO/2 (fune 11, 2007); U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women, Combined Fourth and Fifth Periodic Reports of States Parties: Nigeria, art. 16.1,
CEDAW/ C/NGA/4-5 (Apr. 28, 2003); IJPINGE & LEBEAU, supra note 13, at 32; Williams, supra
note 59, at 24041.
86. Oguli Oumo, supra note 76, at 243,247.
87. Id. at 247-48.
88. See Bond, Gender, Discourse, supra note 12, at 541 (describing the controversy
surrounding polygamy in the drafting of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa).
89. Adjetey, supra note 34, at 1356 (arguing that " [mjale dominated societies employ
customary law to hold women captive to their reproductive functions.").
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a) FGM
Female genital mutilation (FGM) refers to the process of "intentionally
alter[ing] or injur[ing] female genital organs for non-medical reasons." 90
The World Health Organization divides FGM into four categories:
clitoridectomy (Type 1), excision (Type II), infibulation (Type III), and other
procedures involving genital cutting for non-medical reasons (Type IV).91
Infibulation, which involves "the removal of the clitoris, labia minora, and
parts of the labia majora," is the most severe form of FGM.92 The WHO
estimates that 92 million African girls aged ten and above have undergone
FGM.93 Prevalence rates of FGM vary significantly by country: 78.3% in
Gambia, 3.8% in Ghana, 27.1% in Kenya, 58.2% in Liberia, 85.2% in Mali,
29.6% in Nigeria, 14.6% in Tanzania, and 0.8% in Uganda. 94 The health
consequences of FGM can be severe or fatal and may include: "acute pain,
post-operative shock, urine retention, bladder infection, . . . hemorrhaging,
tetanus, septicemia,"9 5 and transmission of the HIV virus through
unsanitary surgical tools. 96
Communities that practice FGM do so for a variety of reasons. FGM
stems from gender inequality and "represents society's control over
women."97 Some view FGM as a way to restrict women's sexuality by
eliminating or "reducing their sexual fulfillment." 98 These families believe
90. WORLD HEALTH ORG., Female Genital Mutilation (Feb. 2010),
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs241/en/.
91. CTR. FOR REPROD. RTS., FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION: A MATTER OF HUMAN RIGHTS 8
(2d ed. 2006). The WHO defines the categories as follows:
Clitoridectomy: partial or total removal of the clitoris and . . . in very rare cases, only
the prepuce ....
Excision: partial or total removal of the clitoris and the labia minora, with or without
excision of the labia majora . . . .
Infibulation: narrowing of the vaginal opening through the creation of a covering
seal. The seal is formed by cutting and repositioning the inner, or outer, labia with
or without removal of the clitoris.
Other: all other harmful procedures to the female genitalia for non-medical
purposes, e.g. pricking, piercing, incising, scraping and cauterizing the genital area.
WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 90.
92. Adjetey, supra note 34, at 1362.
93. Female Genital Mutilation, supra note 90.
94. These figures are from 2004 to 2009, depending on the country. WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
Female Genital Mutilation and Other Harmful Practices,
http://www.who.int/reproductivehealth/topics/fgm/prevalence/en/index.html (last
visited Feb. 21, 2011).
95. Adjetey, supra note 34, at 1362.
96. See Patricia A. Broussard, The Importance of Female Genital Mutilation to the West: The
Cruelest Cut of All, 44 U.S.F. L. REV. 787, 791 (2010); Kelleen O'Fallon, Matter of A-T : Opening the
Door for Gender as a Particular Social Group in Asylum Applications, 9 U. MD. L. J. RACE, RELIGION,
GENDER & CLASS 397, 400 (2009).
97. WORLD HEALTH ORG. ET AL., ELIMINATING FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION: AN
INTEIRAULNCY STAT EMENT 5 (2008), available at
http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2008/9789241596442.eng.pdf [hereinafter
INTERAGENCY STATEMENT].
98. CTR. FOR REPROD. RTS., supra note 91, at 8.
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that this increases the chance that a young woman will remain a virgin
before marriage. 9 Virginity at marriage is an entrenched social value.100
Many communities, in fact, treat women's virginity as a prerequisite for
marriage.101 Families have a financial incentive to ensure a daughter's
virginity at marriage, as virginity may affect the family's negotiations over
the amount of bridewealth it will receive at the time of her marriage. 0 2
There are also several historical-institutional reasons for the practice.
Women who have undergone FGM and view it as an important marker of
their own identity often support the practice.103 The mostly female
practitioners who charge fees for performing FGM also have an economic
incentive to continue the practice.104 In communities where FGM is
common, there tends to be strong social pressure for families to choose
FGM for their daughters. 0 5 Although religious texts do not encourage the
practice, some religious leaders support FGM as a religious act.106 Other
religious leaders openly oppose the practice.107
Some countries have enacted laws prohibiting FGM, but many of these
have been criticized as ineffective.106 It is widely recognized among non-
governmental organizations that criminal prohibitions alone will
accomplish little.'09 Legal sanctions must be accompanied by widespread
public education campaigns and broader policy initiatives designed to
enhance women's autonomy in matters related to sexual and reproductive
health."10 One strategy that has enjoyed success in parts of Kenya, for
99. See, e.g., Zsaleh E. Harivandi, Invisible and Involuntary: Female Genital Mutilation as a
Basis for Asyl um, 95 CORNELL L. REv. 599, 611 (2010).
100. See generally Erika R. George, Virginity Testing and South Afica's HIV/AIDS Crisis:
Beyond Rights Universalism and Cultural Relativism Toward Health Capabilities, 96 CAL. L. REV.
1447 (2008).
101. Patricia A. Armstrong, Female Genital Mutilation: The Move Toward the Recognition of
Violence Against Women as a Basis for Asylum in the United States, 21 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 95,
97-98 (1997) ("Because several African tribes prescribe virginity as a prerequisite for marriage,
supporters believe FGM protects a woman from her own desire to have promiscuous sexual
intercourse.").
102. George, supra note 100, at 1454 (describing how "[a] potential bride's virginity was a
factor in the negotiations between a bride's parents and her future in-laws to determine what
amount of wealth was to be transferred from the groom's family to the bride's family . .
103. WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 97, at 7.
104. See, e.g., EFUA DORKENOO, CUTTING THE ROSE: FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION 50 (1994)
("Part of the reason for the continuation of the practice of FGM lies in the fact that it is an
irreplaceable source of revenue for excisors.").
105. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 97, at 5. ("Where female genital mutilation is
widely practiced, it is supported by both men and women, usually without question, and
anyone departing from the norm may face condemnation, harassment, and ostracism.").
106. See id. at 6.
107. See id.
108. Annotated Legal Bibliography on Gender, 14 CARDOZO J. L. & GENDER 819, 848 (2008)
(noting that "[rIegional laws have also been ineffective because they do not have adequate
procedures to monitor the violation of the crime and are rarely enforced.").
109. See, e.g., CIR. FOR REP'ROD. RTs., supra note 91, at 28-29.
110. For a discussion of how legal sanctions might interact with other methodologies, see,
for example, Rebecca J. Cook, International Protection of Women's Reproductive Rights, 24 N.Y.U.
J. INT'L L. & POL. 645, 682 (1992).
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example, is the promotion of alternative rites of passage for girls."
b) Virginity Testing and "Curative Rape"
Another way of restricting sexual behavior prior to marriage is through
virginity testing, which has enjoyed a resurgence in South Africa.
"Virginity testing, a prenuptial custom traditionally conducted just prior to
marriage, refers to the examination of females to ascertain whether or not
they are sexually chaste."112 In South Africa, some have embraced virginity
testing not only as a way to police morality among young women but also
as a tool to combat the spread of HIV/AIDS.113 Misconceptions about
virginity further complicate the issue. For example, "[sjome South African
researchers attribute the increase in sexual violence against young girls who
are presumed to be virgins to a belief, gaining credence in some
communities, that sexual intercourse with a virgin can 'cleanse' men with
HIV or AIDS of the disease."" 4 Communities often label those who fail the
tests as "unmarriageable." 1' 5  The emotional and physical risks for girls
who fail the tests are significant, with many exposed to shame and
ostracism within the community and abuse within their families." 6 On the
other hand, some South African feminists oppose the practice as a violation
of young women's privacy and equality rights."7
Human rights organizations in South Africa also report that lesbians in
that country are targeted for so-called "curative" or "corrective" rape.118
An Action Aid report documents instances of such rape, noting that "only
one in five reported rapes ends up in court, with just over 4% of these cases
resulting in a conviction."119 "Curative" rape represents a violent and
extreme example of enforced heteronormativity. The rape is designed to
"cure" homosexuality and make the victim "marriageable." Each of these
strategies for regulating sexuality harms women and does so largely in the
name of marriage.
111. CTR. FOR REPROD. RTS., supra note 91, at 40.
112. George, supra note 100, at 1449.
113. Id. at 1447-48.
114. Id. at 1461.
115. Id. at 1462.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1449-50 (describing the "politically charged" nature of the debate over virginity
testing in South Africa as a clash between "human rights universalism and cultural
relativism").
118. For more information on what is referred to as "curative" or "corrective" rape, see
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & THE INT'L GAY & LESBIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMM'N, MORE THAN A
NAME: STATE-SPONSORED HOMOPHOBIA AND ITS CONSEQUENCES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 193
(2003), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/safriglhrc3O3.pdf
[hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS WATCHI.
119. ACTION AID, HATE CRIMES: THE RISE OF "CORRECTIVE" RAPE IN SOUTH AFRICA 13
(2009), available at http://www.actionaid.org.ul/101756/hatescrimes the rise of corrective
rape in southtafrica.html.
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B. Rights Within Marriage
1. Property
Land is the most important form of property in many parts of
Commonwealth Africa.120  Because many African communities are
agrarian, a lack of access to property "makes women economically
dependent and thwarts their efforts at achieving economic
independence." 121 In Botswana, many unmarried women still rely on their
fathers or brothers for access to land or cattle.122 Even when married
women contribute to the purchase of land, they "rarely hold matrimonial
land as joint owners with their spouses." 123 Customary law in Kenya
permits women to farm land but not to own it or make decisions as to its
maintenance or disposal.124 Customary law in Malawi allows women's
ownership of so-called "feminine" property, such as cooking utensils, but
not "masculine" property, such as land or vehicles.125 Similarly, customary
law in Zimbabwe restricts women's ownership to moveable property, such
as cash or livestock.126 Despite this limited property right, "most moveable
property acquired during the course of a customary marriage belongs to the
husband."127
In some countries, statutory law has provided improved access to
property within marriage. For example, in 1996 Botswana amended its
Deeds Registry Act, allowing women to execute deeds and other
documents without their husbands' consent.128 Tanzania's Law of Marriage
120. See Florence Butegwa, Mediating Culture and Human Rights in Favour of Land Rights for
Women in Africa: A Framework for Community-Level Action, in CULTURAL TRANSFORMATION AND
HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA 108,110 (Abdullahi A. An-Na'im ed., 2002) ("[W]omen increasingly
realize that lack of access to land is the major determinant of poverty and social status both in
rural and urban areas.").
121. Akua Kuenyehia, Women, Marriage, and Intestate Succession in the Context of Legal
Pluralism in Africa, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 385, 387 (2006); see also Aparna Polavarapu, Procuring
Meaningful Land Rights for the Women of Rwanda, 14 YALE HUM. RTs. & DEV. L.J. 105 (2011)
(identifying the legal, structural, and historical obstacles to equal rights in land ownership).
122. ELSIE M. ALEXANDER ET AL., BEYOND INEQUALITIES 2005: WOMEN IN BOTSWANA 38
(2005) ("'[I]t is still difficult for single women to access land due to the customary rules and
practices that some Land Board officials still implement.").
123. Bosire Maragia, Gender Struggles in Homosocial Settings: Reconstructing Gender and
Social Equity for Sustainability in Post-Colonial Societies, 16 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 335,
349 (2008).
124. Elin Henrysson & Sandra F. Joireman, On the Edge of the Law: Women's Property Rights
and Dispute Resolution in Kisii, Kenya, 43 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 39,43 (2009).
125. See United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women
[CEDAW], Combined Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Periodic Report of States Parties: Malawi, 81,
CEDAW/C/MWI/2-5 (June 28, 2004) ("For all the marriages however, property rights are
feminised or masculinised. Cooking utensils, for example, are for women while the other
property such as land and cars are usually for men.").
126. CTR. FOR REPROD. LAW AND POLICY, WOMEN OF THE WORLD. ANGLOPHONE AFRICA 142
(1999) [hereinafter ANGLOPHONE AFRICA].
127. Id.
128. See U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Combined
20 [Vol. 14
HeinOnline  -- 14 Yale Hum. Rts. & Dev. L.J. 20 2011
Culture, Dissent, and the State
Act provides some protection for women's property interests in the marital
home by prohibiting alienation by one spouse during the existence of the
marriage. 129 Similarly, Namibia's Married Persons Equality Act, which
applies only to marriages contracted under civil law, requires couples to
register immovable property in both spouses' names.1 30 The Married
Women's Property Act in Ghana ensures the right of women married under
the civil Marriage Ordinance to own property in their own names.131
Even when statutory law permits women's ownership of land or other
property, however, some obstacles remain. For example, when Kenya
passed its Registered Lands Act, which permits women to register title to
land, "men rushed to register land, and the passage of the statute did not
permit subsequent alteration of the register, thereby precluding women
from changing the register to accommodate their interests."132 Despite
some statutory interventions in favor of women's marital property rights,
traditional patriarchal attitudes toward women's role within the family
make it difficult for women to fully enjoy those rights.
2. Non-violence
As in most of the world, in Commonwealth Africa violence against
women in the family occurs with startling regularity. "Any inquiry into the
place of violence in African life runs the risk of reproducing a stereotypical
image of a homogenous and 'uncivilized' part of the world that has helped
to justify Western racism, colonialism, and paternalism." 133 Nevertheless,
violence against women occurs in Africa, as in other parts of the world, and
must be examined. Although communities differ widely in their attitudes
toward violence against women, detailed case studies and specific
comparisons across borders are simply beyond the scope of this Article.
Partly a result of the normalization of violence within the family, 134 the
vast majority of familial gender-based violence goes unreported. 35
Statistics indicate that physical abuse, including marital rape, is common in
African marriages.136 In Ghana, one third of women surveyed reported
Initial, Second, and Third Periodic Reports of States Parties: Botswana, art. 51, CEDAW/C/BOT/3
(Oct. 20, 2008).
129. ANGLOPHONE AFRICA, supra note 126, at 123.
130. IIPINGE & LEBEAU, supra note 13, at 10.
131. Fenrich & Higgins, supra note 5, at 283.
132. ANGLOPHONE AFRICA, supra note 126, at 67.
133. Scott London, Domestic Violence: Sub-Saharan Africa, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WOMEN &
ISLAMIC CULTURES, supra note 10, at 126.
134. The Malawian saying "chikwati ndikupilira," or "marriage demands perseverance,"
conveys the notion that a couple should remain together regardless of the existence of abuse.
Rose Chisowa, Why Women and the Girl Child?, in GENDER BASED VIOLENCE: TWENTY THREE
STORIES 30, 32 (Kamanga Zulu ed., 2008).
135. See, e.g., Alfred Banda, The Silence of a Battered Wife, in GENDER BASED VIOLENCE, supra
note 134, at 25, 29 (" [O~nly 4% of the total victims reported theft cases to police because they
do not view abuse as illegal and find it not serious enough to warrant police intervention").
136. See, e.g., Mumbi Machera, Domestic Violence in Kenya: A Survey of Newspaper Reports, in
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being hit, slapped, or otherwise physically abused by a current or recent
partner.1 37 According to another study, over 49% of women in Malawi have
been victims of domestic violence' 38 Almost 60% of women surveyed
reported sexual abuse by a partner at some point in their lives.139 Of that
group, only 4% reported the abuse to the police.140
Commentators differ on the causes of domestic violence in
Commonwealth Africa.141 There is, however, an emerging consensus that
unequal power relations between men and women are a core factor in
gender-based violence in the home.142 Many men attempt to justify marital
violence by suggesting that their wives have not lived up to their marital
obligations. Some suggest, for example, that a woman's behavior in the
home may lead to abuse if she is not "cautious and calm"143 (behavior
traditionally expected from a wife), or if she does not fulfill her customary
marital duties such as "cooking, cleaning, and washing."144  These
"justifications" for violence reflect rigid gender-based roles within the
family.
Although it is common for the general penal code to criminalize
assault, few African Commonwealth countries have enacted specific
domestic violence legislation.145 Marital rape is not considered a crime in
many Commonwealth African countries.146 In Malawi, for example,
MEN, WOMEN AND VIOLENCE 1997, 27, 47 (Felicia Oyekanmi ed., 1997); Chi Mgbako et al., We
Will Still Live: Confronting Stigma and Discrimination Against Women Living with HIV/AIDS in
Malawi, 31 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 528, 545 (2008) (referring to a study that "indicated that three-
quarters of all the women surveyed had been forced to have sex by their intimate partners at
least once.").
137. Marilyn Aniwa, Prevalence, in BREAKING THE SILENCE & CHALLENGING THE MYTHS OF
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN GHANA 50, 65 (Dorcas Coker-Appiah & Kathy
Cusack eds., 1999) [hereinafter BREAKING THE SILENCE].
138. Banda, supra note 135, at 29.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. In Ghana, for example, one commentator suggests that alcohol, job status, educational
status, stress, poverty, gender roles, relationships with in-laws and other members of the
family, and conflict over children, inter alia, are all factors in marital conflict. Henrietta Abane,
Towards Research into Wife Battering in Ghana: Some Methodological Issues, in MEN, WOMEN AND
VIOLENCE, supra note 136, at 16, 20.
142. See, e.g., Valorie K. Vojdik, Conceptualizing Intimate Violence and Gender Equality: A
Comparative Approach, 31 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 487,495 (2008).
143. Abane, supra note 141, at 16 ("In Ghana, wife beating is a man's way of teaching the
wife a lesson, and even women have shown less sympathy for victims of wife beating who,
according to custom, should learn to be cautious and calm.").
144. Kathy Cusack, Defining Violence, in BREAKING THE SILENCE, supra note 137, at 1, 15
("Failure of a woman or child to fulfill socially defined roles or expectations were [sic] usually
used to describe disobedience.").
145. Botswana, for example, lacks a law specifically prohibiting gender-based violence.
WOMEN & LAW IN S. AFR. RESEARCH TRUST, No SAFE PLACE: INCEST AND DEFILEMENT IN
BIOTSWANA 19 (2002). Similarly, the Gambia has no specific laws that deal with domestic
violence; rather, physical violence within a marriage is covered by general assault laws. See
U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Combined Initial, Second,
and Third Periodic Reports of States Parties: Gambia, art. 44, CEDAW/C/GMB/1-3 (Apr. 10,
2003).
146. See, e.g., ALICE K. ARMSTRONG, CULTURE AND CHOICE: LESSONS FROM SURVIVORS OF
22 [Vol. 14
HeinOnline  -- 14 Yale Hum. Rts. & Dev. L.J. 22 2011
2011] Culture, Dissent, and the State 23
statutory law assumes consent to sex to be part of the marital contract.147 As
long as the "punishment" is not disproportionate to the "offense,"
customary law in Ghana and Zimbabwe allows a husband to "chastise" his
wife.148
Victims of domestic violence and marital rape may have a number of
reasons for not reporting the violence to police. First, access to the legal
system and to social services can be quite limited. For example, 64% of
women living in rural Malawi simply did not know where to go to report
domestic violence.149 Second, marital rape simply may not be
criminalized.150 Third, even if gender-based violence is prohibited, police
and prosecutors may not take the issue seriously.15 ' Fourth, violence may
be so widespread that victims themselves do not view the behavior as
criminal. The belief that husbands have the right to physically punish their
wives is widespread among Commonwealth African countries.152 A 2004
United Nations factsheet, for example, reported that 51% of women in
Botswana believed that their husbands had the right to beat them.' 53 For
these and other reasons, legal prohibitions on domestic violence and
marital rape are not always effective. Widespread public education and
awareness-raising efforts are necessary in order to change public perception
concerning violence against women in the home.154
GENDER VIOLENCE IN ZIMBABWE 81 (1998) ("'Culturally' a wife is expected to have sex with her
husband, and he is said to be entitled to decide when and how."); BARBARA LOPI ET AL.,
BEYOND INEQUALITIES 2008: WOMEN IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 95 (2008); Cusack, supra note 137, at
29 (observing "unanimity between both women and men that there is no such thing as forced
sex in marriage or that it does not constitute violence").
147. MARION BAUMGART DOS SANTOS, CONSENSUS: COMBATING GENDER BASED VIOLENCE
THROUGH ISLAM, TRADITION, AND LAW 62 (2006).
148. ARMSTRONG, supra note 146, at 55-56 ("[M]any people claim that moderate
'chastisement' of the wife by the husband is allowed . .. .Written records of Shona traditional
law state that a woman may complain if her husband hits her unreasonably or excessively.");
Cusack, supra note 144, at 15 ("[l]t was acceptable to correct, discipline or chastise women and
children so long as the chastisement was seen as being proportionate to the act of
disobedience.").
149. Chisowa, supra note 134, at 34.
150. See, e.g., BHAGLAWATTY GUNGANAH ET AL., BEYOND INEQUALITIES: WOMEN IN
MAURITIUS 28 (1997) (commenting that in Mauritius, "[gliven the state of the present provision
of the law concerning marital obligation it is almost impossible to prosecute marital rape").
151. ARMSTRONG, supra note 146, at 70 ("Although the police are in many instances
helpful, in others they prefer to let the couple solve their problems at home and do not want to
get involved."); Mansah Prah, Outcomes to Women's and Children's Responses, in BREAKING THE
SILENCE, supra note 137, at 110.
152. See, e.g., Morayo Atinmo, Sociocultural Implications of Wife Beating Among the Yoruba in
Ibadan City, Nigeria, in MEN, WOMEN AND VIOLENCE, supra note 136, at 77, 82 (" [A] man does
have the right to control his wife, to be the head of the family, the boss, without being queried.
This is part of the cultural nexus in which men are seen as having a natural right to control and
discipline their wives."); B6lair, supra note 35, at 570 ("[Ujnder customary law, the man has the
right to beat his wife if she 'misbehaves."').
153. LOPI ET AL., supra note146, at 95.
154. See Kathy Cusack, Conclusions, in BREAKING THE SILENCE, supra note 137, at 172, 173
("Such a campaign should include rights awareness work targeting primarily women and
children and information about existing legislation and services, as well as how to access such
services.").
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3. Reproductive Rights
The ability to make decisions about one's reproductive capacity and
health is a fundamental right.155 A woman's freedom to choose the number
and spacing of her children may dramatically affect her health, economic
status, education, and many other facets of life.'56 In parts of
Commonwealth Africa, however, the prevailing legal regime actively limits
women's control over sex and reproduction.157
Colonialism brought restrictive abortion laws to Commonwealth
Africa.' 58 Before the colonial period, some African communities accepted
the use of abortifacients.159 The Maasai in Kenya, for example, allowed the
abortion of unwanted pregnancies in certain situations, such as the
pregnancy of a young, unmarried woman, or in cases of rape.160 In the
postcolonial period, access to abortion has remained limited throughout
Commonwealth Africa.161 Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique,
Swaziland, and Tanzania have not modified their abortion laws since
independence, restricting abortion to situations where it is necessary to
save the life of the pregnant woman.162 Some countries recognize a limited
right to abortion when pregnancy or childbirth threaten a woman's
physical or mental health.163 In Botswana, a woman may also end a
pregnancy caused by rape within the first sixteen weeks.'64 The Ghanaian
Criminal Code provides an exception to the general prohibition in cases of
rape and incest, as well as where there is a risk of serious disease or
deformity of the child. 165 Punishment for violating these laws is often strict.
155. See Cook, supra note 110, at 684 (arguing that "[wiomen's right to control their fertility
... [may] be considered a fundamental key that opens up women's capacity to enjoy other
human rights").
156. See, e.g., U.N. POPULATION FUND, THE RIGHT TO CHOOSE: REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS AND
REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH 10 (1997).
157. See Higgins et al., supra note 68, at 1677.
158. Charles Ngwena, An Appraisal of Abortion Laws in Southern Africa from a Reproductive
Health Rights Perspective, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 708, 711 (2004).
159. Id. ("Use of abortifacients was largely regarded as a matter for the family rather than
the indigenous court."). But see Nana Oye Lithur, Destigmatising Abortion: Expanding
Community Awareness of Abortion as a Reproductive Health Issue in Ghana, 8 AFR. J. REPROD.
HEALTH 70, 72 (2004) ("Traditionally, abortion is perceived as a shameful act. In the Ga
tradition, families where women are known to have performed abortion are branded as 'the
family where its womenfolk remove pregnancies."').
160. Fred Sai, International Commitments and Guidance on Unsafe Abortion, 8 AFR. J. REPROD.
HEALTH 15,21 (2004).
161. See Ngwena, supra note 158, at 716 ("lTIhe majority of SADC countries have. . . held
on to their colonial bequest of unduly restrictive and inaccessible abortion regimes at the cost
of oppressing women, and jettisoning the goal of achieving gender equality.").
162. Id. at 712.
163. See id. at 711 (providing a comparison of abortion laws in SADC countries).
164. See U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Combined
Initial, Second, and Third Periodic Reports of States Parties: Botswana, art. 240, CEDAW/C/ BOT/3,
(Oct. 20, 2008).
165. See JOHANNA 0. SVANIKIER, WOMEN'S RIGHTS AND THE LAW IN GHANA 59 (1997)
(discussing exceptions to the law restricting abortion).
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In Kenya, helping a woman to obtain an abortion exposes the accused to up
to fourteen years in prison, and a woman who has had an illegal abortion
faces up to seven years' imprisonment.166 In Ghana, both parties could be
sentenced to up to five years in prison.167
Access to safe abortion depends greatly upon a woman's
socioeconomic position. Safe abortion procedures are largely available only
to wealthier, educated women. 168 Unsafe abortion often leads to severe
medical problems or even death. 169 Approximately 40% of women around
the world who die from unsafe abortions are African (about 34,000 each
year).170 In 1991, 40% of admissions to Cameroonian OB/GYN emergency
wards were related to illegal abortions.171 In a study of two major hospitals
in Ghana, it was found that unsafe abortion caused between 22% and 30%
of maternal deaths.172 Another study estimated that unsafe abortion caused
one third of maternal deaths in Kenya.' 73 Throughout Africa, there is an
inverse correlation between abortion rights and infant and maternal
mortality.174 Although not as restrictive as abortion laws, lack of access to
contraceptives in Commonwealth Africa also interferes with women's
enjoyment of their reproductive rights.175 Breastfeeding and postpartum
abstinence remain the most important methods of reproductive
regulation.176
Although women bear the brunt of pregnancy and childbirth, the
decision to conceive and space their children is often made by their
husbands. 77 Some women fear violence, rejection, or accusations of
extramarital affairs from their partners if they suggest condom use.178
Doctors in Cameroon must have the husband's written permission before
undertaking a permanent sterilization procedure on women. 179 In some
166. ANGLOPHONE AFRICA, supra note 126, at 63.
167. Id. at 40.
168. See Sai, supra note 160, at 16.
169. See Lithur, supra note 159, at 72.
170. See Ngwena, supra note 158, at 709.
171. CfR. FOR REPROD. LAW & POLICY, WOMEN OF THE WORLD: FRANCOPHONE AFRICA 76
(1999).
172. Lithur, supra note 159, at 72.
173. ANGLOPHONE AFRICA, supra note 126, at 54.
174. See Chad M. Gerson, Toward an International Standard of Abortion Rights: Empirical Data
from Africa, 18 PACE INT'L L. REV. 373,380 (2006).
175. See Ebeneezer Durojaye & Victoria Balogun, Human Rights Implications of Mandatory
Premarital HIV Testing in Nigeria, 24 INT'L J. L. POL'Y & FAM. 245, 247 (2010).
176. See Sarah C. Richards, "Spoiling the Womb": Definitions, Aetiologies and Responses to
Infertility in North West Province, Cameroon, 6 AFR. J. REPROD. HEALTH 84, 87 (2002).
177. Adjetey, supra note 34, at 1359 ("[Alfter the payment of the bride price all decisions in
relation to a woman's reproductive life are determined by her husband, who has paid for this
right. This in turn impacts on her ability to make decisions on how many children she will bear
and the amount of spacing between each birth.").
178. See LISA VETTEN & KAILASH BHANA, VIOLENCE, VENGEANCE, AND GENDER 10 (2001)
(discussing reasons that South African women do not use contraception despite the AIDS
pandemic).
179. See U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Initial Reports
of States Parties: Cameroon, CEDAW/ C/tCMR/1, 95 (May 9, 1999).
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communities, the practice of lobola limits a wife's ability to make decisions
regarding contraception, as her husband may believe that he bought the
right to control her reproductive life.180
When a woman does conceive, she faces the threat of maternal
mortality. The risk of a woman in Sub-Saharan Africa dying in pregnancy
over the course of her life is roughly 1 in 13.181 By contrast, women in
industrialized countries face a 1 in 4,100 chance of dying in childbirth. 182
Pregnancy is a significant risk for a woman and one that she may not
undertake voluntarily.
Women's ability to exercise their reproductive rights is slowly
improving throughout Africa. Fertility rates are dropping, 83 and certain
governments have issued official policies to support family planning.184
Nevertheless, women's access to contraception and safe abortions remains
limited. Women's inability to regulate the number and spacing of their
children sometimes exposes them to devastating economic, cultural, and
medical consequences.
C. Rights at Dissolution of Marriage
1. Property
Statutory law generally regulates the dissolution of civil marriages.
Ethiopia, Ghana, and South Africa, among other countries, have extended
the reach of formal, civil courts in matters related to dissolution of
marriage.185 Some Commonwealth countries have retained a fault-based
divorce system. Civil divorce in Namibia, for example, is permissible upon
a showing of adultery, malicious desertion, and under certain
circumstances imprisonment and insanity, with a larger share of marital
property going to the "innocent" party.186 Other countries allow no-fault
divorce within civil marriages on the grounds of "irretrievable breakdown"
of the marriage. 87
Customary law generally provides little property for divorcing
women. 88 Customary divorces are often negotiated by the families of the
180. See Adjetey, supra note 34, at 1359.
181. UNICEF, PROGRESS SINCE THE WORLD SUMMIT FOR CHILDREN: A STATISTICAL REVIEW
14 (2001), available at http://www.unicef.org/publications/files/pub-
wethechildrenstatsen.pdf.
182. Id.
183. ANGLOPHONE AFRICA, supra note 124, at 30, 53 (demonstrating falling fertility rates in
Ghana and Kenya).
184. Id. at 37 (describing initiatives of the Ghanaian government).
185. CfR. FOR REPROD. LAW & POLICY, WOMEN OF THE WORLD: ANGLOPHONE AFRICA: 2003
SUPPLEMENT 167 (2003).
186. IIPINGE & LEBEAU, supra note 13, at 32.
187. ANGLOPHONE AFRICA, supra note 126, at 141 ("Irretrievable breakdown is defined to
be a state where 'there is no reasonable prospect of the restoration of a normal marriage
relationship.'").
188. See, e.g., Sam, supra note 46, at 212-13 ("At dissolution of a traditional marriage before
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spouses' 89 and often require that the wife's family repay any bridewealth
that was paid at the time of the marriage. 190 Divorce under customary law
rarely provides the divorcing wife any property beyond a minimal amount
of money or personal property. 91 In Ghana, women divorcing under
customary law may be entitled to "send off" money.192
According to Zimbabwe's Matrimonial Causes Act, courts must
equitably divide marital property in the event of dissolution of a registered
customary marriage.193  Because many Zimbabwean women have
unregistered customary law marriages, however, they are unable to receive
relief under the Matrimonial Causes Act.194 In Ghana, the Matrimonial
Causes Act governs divorces in civil law marriages and, in very limited
circumstances, some customary marriages.195 As I have noted elsewhere, in
Ghana, "[diespite additional constitutional guarantees requiring that assets
jointly acquired during the marriage be 'equitably' distributed upon
divorce, women continue to be at the mercy of judges' discretion in a legal
and social environment in which women's financial and nonmonetary
contributions to the marriage are minimized or ignored." 196
2. Custody and Maintenance
Child custody decisions under customary law in patrilineal
communities in Commonwealth Africa favor the father and the father's
family.197 Under customary law in many countries with patrilineal systems,
the father takes custody of any non-infant children, because children
resulting from marriage are considered part of the father's extended
family.198 In some cases, the payment of bridewealth is dispositive in
determining custody under customary law,199 because traditionally,
family elders, men's exclusive property rights often leave women with nothing, particularly
when family elders determine that a women is at fault in a divorce.").
189. ANGLOPHONE AFRICA, supra note 126, at 43.
190. Sam, supra note 46, at 212 ("When women's parents are unable to return the dowry
money, women cannot escape bad or abusive marriages.").
191. See, e.g., Davies, supra note 68, at 19; Barbara Stark, When Globalization Hits Home:
International Family Law Comes of Age, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1551,1577 (2006).
192. Ghana's Matrimonial Causes Act allows women and men in customary marriages to
petition the formal courts to apply the provisions of the Act subject "to the peculiar incidents
of that marriage." ANGLOPHONE AFRICA, supra note 126, at 43.
193. TICHAGWA, supra note 44, at 20.
194. Id.
195. Johanna Bond, Introduction to Chapter Three: Women's Rights Within the Family, in
VOICES OF AFRICAN WOMEN, supra note 4, at 184.
196. Id. at 184-85.
197. Regina Lule Mutyaba, Comparative Study of the Status of Women Under the Law of
Divorce and of Their Economic Status in Uganda, Britain, and Bangladesh, in VOICES OF AFRICAN
WOMEN, supra note 4, at 218, 227 ("[I1n patrilineal Uganda, children belong to the husband and
courts award custody accordingly.").
198. See U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Combined
Third, Fourth, and Fifth Periodic Reports of States Parties: Ghana, art. 207, CEDAW/C/GHA/3-5
(Apr. 18, 2005).
199. See LETUKA ET AL., supra note 36, at 26; Fareda Banda, Custody and the Best Interests of
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payment served "as a mechanism for the lineage and affiliation of a child to
the father."200
Under statutory law, many courts strive to award custody of a minor
child to the parent who will best provide for the child's welfare. The
Gambia, Lesotho, and Malawi are among the countries that use a "best
interest of the child" standard to determine custody.201 Judges tend to
interpret the "best interest of the child" in terms of material welfare such as
a child's living conditions, medical care, and opportunities for education.202
A 1994 case from South Africa broadened this interpretation to the child's
"physical, moral, emotional, and spiritual welfare." 203 In Zimbabwe, the
primary matter discussed in determining the best interest of the child is
who the caretaker would be and how well that person would accomplish
the task.204
Customary law generally makes no provision for spousal maintenance
after divorce.205 Zimbabwe's 1982 Customary Law and Primary Courts
Amendment Act, however, "imposes a duty on the husband of a woman
under customary law to maintain his wife or ex-wife until her remarriage
or death."206 In contrast to customary law, statutory law in the region tends
to recognize a duty to maintain former spouses. 207 Tanzania's Law of
Marriage Act includes maintenance for women after divorce. 208 In most
Commonwealth African countries where spousal maintenance is available
under statutory law, the woman's subsequent remarriage will extinguish
the Child: Another View from Zimbabwe, in THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 197, 197 (Philip
Alston ed., 1994) (noting that "[tihe question of whether or not lobolo has been paid still tends
to influence the Community Courts' decisions").
200. LAW REFORM COMM'N OF TANZ., REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE LAW OF
SUCCESSION/INHERITANCE 7 (1995).
201. See, e.g., U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Combined
Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Periodic Report of States Parties: Malawi, art. 83
CEDAW/C/MWI/2-5 dune 28, 2004); U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women, Combined Initial, Second, and Third Periodic Reports of States Parties: Gambia, art.
43, CEDAW/C/GMB/1-3 (Apr. 10, 2003); LETUKA ET AL., supra note 36, at 26.
202. Athaliah Molokomme & Keletso Mokobi, Custody and Guardianship of Children in
Botswana: Customary Laws and Judicial Practice within the Framework of the Children's Convention,
in LAW, CULTURE, TRADITION AND CHILDREN'S RIGHTS IN EASTERN AND SOUTHERN AFRICA 191, 194
(Welshman Ncube ed., 1998).
203. Nazeem Goolam, Constitutional Interpretation of the "Best Interests" Principle in South
Africa in Relation to Custody, in THE CHANGING FAMILY: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE
FAMILY AND FAMILY LAW 372 (John Eekelaar & Thandabantu Nhlapo eds., 1998) (quoting
McCall v. McCall, 1994 (3) SA 201 (CC) at 205 (S. Afr.)).
204. See Alice Armstrong, School and Sadza: Custody and the Best Interests of the Child in
Zimbabwe, in THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD, supra note 197, at 160.
205. In Nigeria, for example, "divorce under customary law terminates all rights of
spousal maintenance." ANGLOPHONE AFICA, supra note 126, at 84; see also ALICE ARMSTRONG,
STRUGGLING OVER SCARCE RESOURCES: WOMEN AND MAINTENANCE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 48
(1992).
206. See WOMEN & LAW IN S. AFR. RES. PROJECT, MAINTENANCE IN ZIMBABWE 37 (1991)
(discussing the evolution of maintenance rights under common law).
207. ANGLOPHONE AFRICA, supra note 126, at 141 ("The Matrimonial Causes Act empowers
courts to . .. provide for the maintenance of spouses and children.").
208. Calaguas et al., supra note 42, at 501-02.
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the right to maintenance. 209 Recent legislation in some countries requires
parents to provide maintenance for their children, including those born
outside of the marriage.210
3. Widowhood
The death of a spouse can be emotionally, physically, and financially
devastating for women in Commonwealth African countries. In addition to
the trauma of losing a loved one, widows in some regions face the
possibility of widow inheritance, or levirate marriage, in which a widow is
forced to marry the brother or another male relative of her deceased
husband. 211 Traditionally, levirate marriage provided a vehicle through
which the husband's family could financially support the widow and her
children.212 Today, the practice is sometimes seen as a way for the
husband's family to access any wealth the deceased acquired during his life
and to provide sexual access to the deceased's wife.213
High rates of HIV infection make the tradition particularly dangerous
for widows.214 Some communities also practice "widow cleansing," in
which custom dictates that a widow must undergo a cleansing ritual after
the death of her husband.215 Some rituals require the widow to have sexual
intercourse with one or more men to cleanse the widow of omens or
witchcraft.216  Given the risk of HIV infection, the practice severely
jeopardizes women's health.217
In some countries, widows experience "property grabbing," which
occurs when relatives of the deceased husband come into the widow's
home and confiscate some or all of the moveable property.218 Sometimes
the widow is forced to abandon the marital home and all of her
belongings. 219 In communities that allow property grabbing, it is not
209. WOMEN & LAW IN S. AFR. RES. PROJECT, supra note 206, at 41.
210. See LOPI ET AL., supra note 146, at 83 (describing the 2003 Namibian Maintenance Act).
211. Kenneth Kaoma Mwenda, African Customary Law and Customs: Changes in the Culture of
Sexual Cleansing of Widows and the Marrying of a Deceased Brother's Widow, 11 GONZ. J. INT'L L. 1,
3 (2007).
212. See Laurel L. Rose, Women's Land Access in Post-Conflict Rwanda: Bridging the Gap
Between Customary Land Law and Pending Land Legislation, 13 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 197, 210 (2004).
213. Mwenda, supra note 211, at 14-15.
214. Id. at 20 ("Some people believe the practice contributes to the spread of HIV in sub-
Saharan Africa, where about 25 million people are HIV-positive and about 60% of them are
women.").
215. Id. at 9 (" [Liocal members of the Ndanga village maintain that sexual cleansing of
widows is an indispensable custom and believe in upholding tradition. . .; the belief being
that a widow who has not been sexually cleansed is haunted by the spirit of her deceased
spouse until she has been cleansed by the relatives of the deceased.").
216. Maria Tungaraza, Women's Rights and the AIDS Epidemic in Tanzania, in VOICES OF
AFRICAN WOMEN, supra note 4, at 301,304.
217. Mwenda, supra note 211, at 3.
218. See Rachel C. Loftspring, Inheritance Rights in Uganda. How Equal Inheritance Rights
Would Reduce Poverty and Decrease the Spread of HI V/AIDS in Uganda, 29 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 243,
248 (2007).
219. See Mwenda, supra note 209, at 3.
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uncommon for women to be left destitute after the death of a husband.220
The marital rights women enjoy and the marital indignities that they
endure vary significantly depending on local community practices, the
extent to which the state has injected itself into marriage regulation, and the
extent to which women opt for state rather than community control over
their marriages. In the last several decades, marriage legislation within the
Commonwealth has tended to carve out incrementally larger segments of
family law for state rather than community regulation. Despite the
legislative trend toward greater statutory regulation of marriage and
family, however, communities continue to have a strong hold on the
customs and traditions that regulate entrance into the community through
customary marriage. Indeed, the rates of customary marriage surpass those
of statutory marriage in many Commonwealth African countries. As such,
the promotion of marriage equality through legislation is slow at best,
particularly in areas where legal literacy is low and the influence of custom
and tradition is strong.
II. VALUES ANIMATING REFORM: CULTURE, EQUALITY, AND AGENCY
A. Underlying Values
Two primary societal values form the backdrop for the debates on
marriage reform in much of Commonwealth Africa. These values, the
preservation of culture and the promotion of equality, are at times mutually
reinforcing and at times competing. Recent constitutional reforms in many
Commonwealth African countries reflect a commitment to gender
equality.221 Ugandan scholar Sylvia Tamale has illustrated how some
cultural traditions support women's equality.222  Tamale cites a Ssenga
practice in which the paternal aunts of a new bride provide sexual
instruction to her prior to her wedding. 2 3 Although traditionally focused
on the provision of male sexual pleasure, more recently the practice has
served as a vehicle for women's sexual empowerment. 224 Other cultural
220. Richardson, supra note 9, at 19.
221. See, e.g., Penelope E. Andrews, Striking the Rock: Confronting Gender Equality in South
Africa, 3 MIcH. J. RACE & L. 307, 327-28 (describing the Bill of Rights in the South African
Constitution).
222. See Sylvia Tamale, Faculty of Law, Makerere Univ. (Uganda), Presentation at the
African Feminist Forum: 'African Feminism' Taking a 'Cultural Turn' 3 (Nov. 15, 2006).
223. Id. at 10. In a presentation to the 2006 African Feminist Forum, Sylvia Tamale notes,
"Through a socio-cultural analysis of the institution of Ssenga (sexual initiation by the paternal
aunt), I discovered how the evolution of Ssenga practices has allowed Baganda women to
negotiate agency, autonomy and self-knowledge about their sexuality." REPORT OF THE
AFRICAN FEMINLST FORUM 12 (2006), available at http://www.africanfeministforum.com/wp-
content/uploads/2010/10/AFF-2006-Report.pdf.
224. Id. ("Explicit and daring topics regarding women's pleasurable sexuality . . . have
become part of Ssenga's repertoire of tutoring techniques. While the traditional message from
Ssenga focused on men's sexual pleasure, young Baganda women today are demanding that
men also receive training in how to please their female partners.").
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traditions, such as FGM, are clearly in tension with women's equality.225
Marriage often involves rituals; it reflects customs and traditions that are
central to the communities celebrating the marriage.226 Marriage is also a
site of contestation, in which women and men define themselves both
according to and, at times, in contradistinction to expected roles. 227
Marriage has historically fostered women's subordination within the
family.228  Feminists around the globe have begun to dismantle the
public/private divide, subjecting marriage and the family to public scrutiny
in important ways.229  As a result, most states, including many in
Commonwealth Africa, see marriage as an appropriate political space
within which to intervene to promote gender equality. Marriage, however,
remains a contested space, where both traditional gender roles and gender
equality find expression to varying degrees. Both the preservation of
culture and the promotion of gender equality animate the discourse
surrounding the reform of marriage law in the region.
Around the world, contemporary discourse regarding cultural norms is
punctuated with "challenges by individuals within a culture to modernize,
or broaden, the traditional terms of cultural membership." 230 The success of
these reform efforts depends, in part, on the use of law to either squelch or
facilitate dissent. Madhavi Sunder contrasts these approaches,
characterizing them as "cultural survival" and "cultural dissent,"
respectively. As Sunder explains, "'[c]ultural survival' measures often end
up impeding internal reform efforts to contest discriminatory or repressive
225. See, e.g., INTERAGENCY STATEMENT, supra note 97, at 9. ("Female genital mutilation
violates a series of well established human rights principles, norms and standards . . . .").
226. See Pdiivi Koskinen, To Own or to Be Owned: Women and Land Rights in Rural Tanzania,
2002 HUM. RTs. DEV. Y.B. 145, 153-54 (2002) (explaining that "[cjustomary laws related to the
various aspects of family life are based on the social relations between men and women or,
more specifically, on relations between husbands and wives: these are the unwritten social
rules and structures of a community, which derive from shared values and traditions").
227. Marjorie Weinzweig, Should a Feminist Choose a Marriage-Like Relationship?, 1 HYPATIA
139, 142 (1986) (noting also that "the rigid distribution of roles in traditional marriage and the
personality characteristics which women have had to develop in order to fulfill these roles
have made it very difficult for women to develop themselves as individuals with interests and
ideas separate from those of the members of their families").
228. See, e.g., id. at 14142 (" [In traditional marriage, the woman was treated as the man's
sexual and economic property. . . . [TJhe relationship between the partners is that of
domination and exploitation rather than one based on respect for persons and equality.");
Margot Lovett, "She Thinks She's Like a Man": Marriage and (De)constructing Gender Identity in
Colonial Buha, Western Tanzania, 1943-1960, in "WICKED" WOMEN AND THE RECONFIGURATION
OF GENDER IN AFRICA 47, 53 (Dorothy L. Hodgson & Sheryl A. McCurdy eds., 2001)
(" [Flemales never would shed their subordinate position. Regardless of age, women would
perpetually be jural minors, subject first to the authority of their fathers, then to that of their
husbands, and, eventually, to that of their sons. Thus, they learned that their subordination
was a life-long condition.").
229. Rhonda Copelon, Confronting Domestic Violence and Achieving Gender Equality:
Evaluating Battered Women & Feminist Law-Making by Elizabeth Schneider, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER
Soc. POL'Y & L. 865, 867 (2003) (recalling how feminists challenged "the public/private
distinction," and asserted that "basic human rights principles include certain positive state
responsibilities that should apply to private gender violence").
230. Madhavi Sunder, Cultural Dissent, 54 STAN. L. REV. 495, 495 (2001).
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cultural norms."231 Cultural survivalists use the law to suppress dissent in
the name of preserving a static vision of culture and tradition and often at
the expense of women seeking to assert gender equality rights within a
given culture.232
By contrast, "'cultural dissent' . . . recognizes that cultures are
changing, in some ways for the better."233  Cultural dissent encourages
progressive voices to challenge and redefine cultural norms, including
those that determine marital roles and expectations. It is this tension
between the preservation of culture and the promotion of equality within
culture, or between cultural survival and cultural dissent, that animates the
debates concerning the reform of marriage law in the African
Commonwealth.
Sunder argues that "[w]e ought to ensure that legal efforts to counter
globalization and modernization do not buttress the hegemony of cultural
elites and suppress efforts by cultural dissenters to gain autonomy and
equality within their cultural context." 234 Likewise, I have suggested
elsewhere that some recent regional human rights mechanisms offer
"largely unexplored procedural, dialogical rights that have the potential to
engage women in the public discourse that shapes African customary
law." 235 This kind of facilitated dialogue, therefore, creates the space for
cultural dissenters.
B. Colonialism and the Preservation of Culture
Although Commonwealth African societies had plural legal systems in
the pre-colonial era, colonialism brought a new, Eurocentric version of
pluralism to the continent.236 In most Commonwealth African countries,
British common law applied to Europeans, and customary law applied to
the indigenous population in certain areas like family law.237
Colonial authorities considered customary law to be inferior to the




234. Id. at 504.
235. Bond, Gender, Discourse, supra note 12, at 512.
236. See Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 LAw & SoC'Y REv. 869, 869-70 (1988) ("For
proponents of empire in the nineteenth century, this imposition of European law was a great
gift, substituting civilized law for the anarchy and fear that they believed gripped the lives of
the colonized peoples. . . .").
237. ANNE M.O. GRIFFITHS, IN THE SHADOW OF MARRIAGE: GENDER AND JUSTICE IN AN
AFRICAN COMMUNITY 33-34 (1997) (explaining that "[tlhe rationale behind" the separate
jurisdictions for British common law and customary law "was that the Africans were to be left
to run their own affairs except where these might come into conflict with the interests of
colonial powers").
238. See Merry, supra note 236, at 890 ("During the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, British law represented to the colonizers in India and Africa a substantial advance
over the 'savage' customs of the colonized."); Justice Modibo Ocran, The Clash of Lgal Cultures:
The Treatment of Indigenous Law in Colonial and Post-Colonial Africa, 39 AKRON L. REV. 465, 470
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Reform Commission, colonial authorities viewed customary law as
"inferior, only to be tolerated 'in areas of marginal significance to the
colonial regime' and only to the extent that it was useful as an instrument
of colonial rule." 239  Colonial authorities in South Africa devalued
customary law and invalidated it when they considered it to be
incompatible with "general principles of humanity observed throughout
the civilized world." 240 South African legislation in 1864 allowed Africans
who were - in the words of the colonial authorities - sufficiently
"detribalized . . . to apply for exemption from the application of customary
law." 241
Despite the creation of dual systems of law in which customary law
applied to the family law disputes of the indigenous African population,
the customary law that the colonial authorities applied when called upon to
do so reflected the interpretation of the colonial authorities and the male
indigenous elites with whom they collaborated. 242 Customary law today
thus reflects an amalgam of tradition and colonial influence.
Two important values emerged within the postcolonial state: state
sovereignty and the preservation of indigenous African culture and
tradition. Not surprisingly, post-colonial states keenly protected their
sovereignty.243 As newly independent states, many leaders were also
concerned about democracy and human rights. This balance between
tradition and modernity is evident in the drafting of the African Charter on
Human and Peoples' Rights.244 The drafters of the Charter attempted to
create a treaty that reflected both a basic commitment to human rights and
"African circumstances and sensibilities." 245
Having suffered under European occupation, postcolonial states also
(2006) ("In colonial Africa, the merger of the two cultures occurred as the British accepted
customary law to some extent, but also riddled it with so-called repugnancy clauses, in order
to avoid those aspects of African customs that European culture found most appalling,
ridiculous, or simply unhelpful to the inculcation of Christian ideals.").
239. Evadn6 Grant, Human Rights, Cultural Diversity and Customary Law in South Africa, 50 J.
AFR. L. 2,14 (2006) (quoting S. AFR. LAW REFORM COMM'N, THE HUMANIZATION OF COMMON
LAW AND THE INDIGENOUS LAW 10 (1999)).
240. Id. at 13 (citation omitted).
241. Id (citation omitted).
242. See Martin Chanock, Neither Customary Nor Legal: African Customary Law in an Era of
Family Law Reform, 3 INT'L J.L. & FAM. 72, 77 (1989) ("It is important that we understand the
input of the colonial courts and administrators and missionaries into the fashioning of the
customary law of marriage, and that we avoid treating the development of African family law
as if it was isolated from the dominant 'white' system. Once we understand the modern
customary law as the product of this interaction during the colonial period, it again becomes
harder to invoke custom in opposition to reform.").
243. See Adrien Katherine Wing & Tyler Murray Smith, The New African Union and
Women's Rights, 13 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33 (2003) (describing states' insistence
on sovereignty during the post-colonial establishment of the Organization for African Unity
(OAU), followed by the African Union (AU)).
244. Nsongurua J. Udombana, Between Promise and Performance: Revisiting States'
Obligations Under the African Human Rights Charter, 40 STAN. J. INT'L L. 105, 110 (2004).
245. EVA BREMS, HUMAN RIGHTS: UNIVERSALITY AND DIVERSITY 93-94 (2001).
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zealously guarded indigenous culture and tradition.246 Customary law is
seen as the legal expression of culture and tradition and is valued on that
basis. As Fareda Banda notes, "part of the struggle for independence was
so that Africans could reclaim their much derided culture, thus the
resistance to the perceived re-imposition of European values in the guise of
human rights norms." 247
C. Constitutionalism and the Promotion of Equality
Drafters of the postcolonial constitutions and later constitutional
iterations undoubtedly felt a tension between preserving the culture and
traditions that were threatened under colonial rule and the promise of
human rights and democracy, including gender equality. 248 Many of the
constitutions that were drafted during the 1990s, during a wave of
constitutional activity, include gender equality provisions. 249 Some of these
equality provisions, however, are limited in their breadth, making them less
effective in the pursuit of gender equality. 250
In a handful of Commonwealth African countries, the constitutional
text specifically excludes family or customary law from the purview of the
constitutional non-discrimination clause.251 These "exclusionary clauses"
reflect the tension between the preservation of custom and culture and
notions of gender equality.252  In Zimbabwe, the presence of an
exclusionary clause in the constitution led the Supreme Court to conclude,
in the Magaya case, that a customary inheritance law that denied a woman's
right to inherit on the basis of her gender did not violate the constitutional
non-discrimination clause, because issues of inheritance were specifically
excluded from constitutional non-discrimination protection.253
In other countries, customary law is explicitly valued as a source of law
but is nevertheless subject to the Bill of Rights.254 In South Africa in 2008,
the Constitutional Court held that traditional authorities had the right to
develop the customary law in conformity with the Constitution. 255 In so
246. See Koskinen, supra note 226, at 156 ("The customs and traditions of a given people
have political significance for the African states, as they may also act as a symbol of cultural
identity in the post-colonial era.").
247. Fareda Banda, Global Standards: Local Values, 17 INT'L J. L. POL'Y & FAM. 1, 7 (2003).
248. See, e.g., Wing & Smith, supra note 241, at 58 ("It appears that the [African] Charter
was conflicted from the beginning given its attempt to reconcile deep-seated African values
(which arguably subjugate women's gender roles) and the emerging global values of non-
discrimination and gender equality.").
249. See Andrews, supra note 221, at 315.
250. Bond, Constitutional Exclusion, supra note 12, at 291.
251. Id.
252. See id. at 306-07.
253. Magaya v. Magaya 1999 3 L.R.C 35, 40 (Zimb. Sup. Ct.); see also Valerie Knobelsdorf,
Zimbabwe's Magaya Decision Revisited: Women's Rights and Land Succession in the International
Context, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 749, 760-61 (2006).
254. See, e.g., Tracy E. Higgins, Constitutional Chicken Soup, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 709, 711
(2006).
255. Shilubana & Others v. Nwamitwa, 2008 (2) SA 66 (CC) at para. 85 (5. Afr.).
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doing, the Court ruled that the Royal family of the Valoyi in Limpopo had
the right to designate a woman, Ms. Tinyiko Shilubana, as successor to the
chieftaincy title. 256 In another case in South Africa, Bhe v. Magistrate,
Khayelitsha, the Constitutional Court also held that a woman could inherit
property upon the death intestate of her father, contrary to local customary
law.257
In the Zimbabwe case of Magaya and the South African cases of Bhe and
Shilubana, the respective courts struggled with the tension between the
preservation of culture and custom and the promotion of equality norms
within culture. In many ways, the Zimbabwean case represents Sunder's
"cultural survival" approach, while the Bhe and Shilubana cases represent,
in Sunder's terms, a "cultural dissent" approach. 258  The Zimbabwean
Constitution thus shields customary and family law from constitutional
challenge and impedes cultural dissent, whereas the South African text
offers a textual source for dissenting voices.
D. Agency and Choice
Marriage is an expression of entrenched social values throughout the
world, including in Commonwealth Africa. 259 Removing the state from its
regulatory role, therefore, will not likely deter marriage in the region but
will narrow the range of marriage options. Within plural legal systems in
which couples choose to marry according to statutory, customary, or
religious law, withdrawal of the state from marriage regulation would
effectively eliminate the choice of civil marriage, leaving customary and
religious marriage as the options for those seeking to marry. Because
marriage is a particularly highly valued institution in Commonwealth
Africa, if the state were to regulate intimate relationships through the law
of contract - as some feminists in the global North have suggested - many
couples would simply opt for customary or religious marriage instead.
Although the level of state engagement with customary marriage varies by
country, generally the state has little formal oversight over customary
marriages.260 Removal of state regulation would mean that customary and
religious law would exclusively govern women's rights within marriage.
256. Editorial, A Female Child Can Inherit Her Father's Chieftaincy Title, ALLIANCES FOR AFR.
(July 29, 2008), http://www.alliancesforafrica.org/editorial.asp?page-id=137.
257. Bhe and Others v. Khayelitsha Magistrate & Others 2004 (1) SA 580 (CC) (S. Afr.) (holding
that male primogeniture is unconstitutional as it discriminates unfairly against women).
258. See Sunder, supra note 230, at 500-01.
259. See, e.g., Lovett, supra note 41, at 289 ("Pressure [to marry] was brought to bear on
them not only from their own families, but from the wider community as well.").
260. By way of example, the Matrimonial Causes Act in Ghana primarily envisions a role
for traditional leaders in the dissolution of customary marriages. The Act, however, allows the
formal courts to hear a customary divorce upon application by one of the parties. Couples in
customary marriages rarely invoke thiis provision and rely primarily on customary dissolutiun.
See Ulrike Wanitzek, Integration of Personal Laws and the Situation of Women in Ghana: The
Matrimonial Causes Act of 1971 and Its Application by the Courts, 1991 THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUD.
75, 79 (1991).
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Given the patriarchal social and legal structures in Commonwealth
Africa, to what extent can women exercise real choice in selecting a
marriage regime? For many women, the choice of marriage systems is
constrained by the patriarchal social context within which the exercise of
"choice" occurs.261 The choice of marital regimes is, in fact, often made by
the families of the couple rather than the couple themselves. 262 In these
cases, women experience a lack of decisional authority at the hands of both
the older generation and the future husband.
The choice here is not consistent with liberalism, which "posited a
subject whose humanity consisted in her theoretically unlimited potential,
and her capacity to exercise meaningful choice in the direction of her own
life." 263  Kathryn Abrams' theory of partial agency "seeks to describe a
subject whose agency emerges against the backdrop of, and co-exists in
tension with, systemic gender-based oppression." 264 This notion of partial
agency recognizes that women cannot be defined purely as victims of their
culture; they act against and resist gender-based oppression even as they
experience it and internalize it in their daily lives.
Within Commonwealth African countries, women's ability to exercise
agency in pursuit of a more liberal marital regime depends to some extent
on geography. Women in rural areas are less likely to be aware of the
option to choose statutory marriage law or are unable to access the formal
civil legal system. In rural areas of Ghana, for example, "the problems of
distance, poor transportation facilities, travel costs, use of an unknown
court language (English), highly formalized and therefore unintelligible
court procedures, court fees, and the cost of legal representation" are
obstacles for women seeking to access the civil legal system.265 Social
pressure in rural areas also serves as a disincentive to opt out of customary
or religious marriages.266
In many Commonwealth African countries, the majority of couples
choose to marry according to customary law.267 In some cases, couples
enter into a civil marriage and celebrate the marriage according to custom
as well, leading to an informal hybrid marriage.268 According to one
261. See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 12, at 368-69 (remarking that "[tlhe reality is that
women's continuing subordinate status in South Africa curtails the free exercise of her choice
in a range of situations, including whom she chooses to marry.").
262. See, e.g., Higgins et al., supra note 68, at 1671-72 ("The most clear-cut example of
family control is when the family enters into marriage negotiations without the knowledge,
much less the consent, of either individual.").
263. Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal Theory, 95
COLUM. L. REv. 304,326 (1995).
264. Id. at 333.
265. Wanitzek, supra note 259, at 85.
266. Id. ("[I]t is not always easy for somebody who is living in the traditional setting to
escape the framework of customary law as applied in the local community, and to seek a relief
in the state court which is not accepted under the local customary law.").
267. See, e.g., Elsje Bonthuys & Natasha Erlanik, The Interaction Between Civil and Customary
Family Law Rules: Implications for African Women, 1 J. S. AFR. L. 59, 60 (2004).
268. Bolaji Owasanoye, The Regulation of Child Custody and Access in Nigeria, 39 FAM. L. Q.
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estimate, approximately eighty percent of marrying couples in Ghana
marry under customary law. 269 Eliminating the statutory marriage regime,
therefore, would appear to have a minimal impact on the majority of
women in marriages.
These facts notwithstanding, the choice to marry according to civil law
serves two important expressive functions. First, for those who are able to
meaningfully "choose" despite patriarchal constraints on agency, the choice
of civil marriage may signify an act of resistance. A couple's decision to
marry according to statutory law expresses, among other things, a desire
for a more egalitarian vision of marriage. In countries where the majority
of women marry according to customary or religious law, the minority of
women who choose civil marriage exercise partial agency and constitute
examples of Sunder's cultural dissenters. Second, the provision of a
statutory alternative to customary or religious marriage expresses the
state's intention to offer a more egalitarian vision of marriage. Of course,
there is often a substantial gap between the more egalitarian vision of
marriage expressed in statutes and the realities of marriage as experienced
in the daily lives of women.270 Nevertheless, the existence of a state-
sponsored marriage alternative that seeks to promote equality, even one
that falls short of that goal, signals that equality is a valued social good.
The choice to marry according to civil law is a complex one fraught not
only with issues of cultural identity and self-assertion but also with issues
of colonialism. Because statutory family law was introduced during the
colonial period and initially applied only to colonial authorities, the
statutory marriage regime has retained some colonial undertones. As
Ulrike Wanitzek suggests in the context of Ghana, "the [civil] marriage is
seen as the 'white man's system of marriage." 271 This racial coding may
make it more complicated for women to opt for statutory marriage.
Those women who exercise agency by opting out of customary or
religious marriage regimes do so for a variety of reasons, including the
perception that statutory regimes offer greater rights protection for women
in marriage, which is often but not always the case. 272 Were the state to
405, 408 (2005) (describing the trend in Nigeria, "particularly predominant among educated
couples, . . . to first perform a customary or Islamic marriage, with all of its prescribed
incidents, followed by a church or registry wedding that is statutory and monogamous in
nature").
269. Fenrich & Higgins, supra note 5, at 284.
270. See Higgins et al., supra note 68, at 1677-78 ("This understanding of man as head of the
household and a rejection of norms of equality in the home was echoed in many interviews
with women themselves. For example, in GaMatlala, one woman explained that 'in our homes
the husband is master, we don't want to be in charge of the home.' Another added that 'we
agree that the Constitution says that equality exists, but in our home we want to follow our
customs."').
271. Wanitzek, supra note 259, at 82.
272. See Garton Sandifolo Kamchedzera, Malawi: Improving Family Welfare?, 32 U.
LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 369, 372 (1993) ("Some Africans deliberately ignore the customary
marriage system for the security the monogamous common-law-based marriage is believed to
offer due to the difficulty in dissolving such a marriage. However, in a society where the
2011] 37
HeinOnline  -- 14 Yale Hum. Rts. & Dev. L.J. 37 2011
YALE HUMAN RIGHTS & DEVELOPMENT L.J.
withdraw from marriage regulation, making customary or religious law the
de facto marriage regime, it would remove an important avenue for women
to exercise agency in defining the contours of the marital relationship and
its corresponding rights and duties. The option to exercise agency in this
way has a very real impact on women who exercise the option and serves
an important expressive function even for those who do not.
Thus, removing the state from marriage regulation entirely would
effectively cede control over all aspects of marriage to local communities.
Although the cultural constraints on women's agency in the choice of
marital regime are significant, it is important to preserve meaningful choice
for those fortunate enough to be able to exercise it. Moreover, the choice of
marital regimes has symbolic and expressive value, offering women an
alternative vision of marriage that may incrementally alter gender roles
over the course of generations.
III. JUSTIFIABLE STATE INTERFERENCE
A. Questioning the State's Role in Marriage
A number of scholars in the global North have recently advocated a
limited role for state oversight of marriage. 273 Martha Fineman has argued
that the state should extricate itself from marriage regulation entirely,
leaving couples to negotiate a contract that would govern the rights and
responsibilities of their relationship.274 Others have advocated for a limited
role for the state in overseeing a registration system that would allow
couples to register a variety of intimate relationships, including but not
limited to conjugal relationships. 275 Some commentators have suggested
that retaining marriage for opposite-sex couples and adding a civil union
status for same-sex couples is the most politically viable approach. 276 Still
others have argued for retaining marriage but extending it to include same-
sex couples. 277 Although the level of state involvement in the regulation of
intimate relationships remains a hotly contested issue, a number of
feminists envision a shrinking role for the state as regulator.
In contrast, I argue that in Commonwealth Africa, the state should have
literacy rate is very low, the knowledge of the advantages offered by the different family legal
systems is limited.").
273. See generally Solot & Miller, supra note 1.
274. Fineman, supra note 2, at 57 (arguing that "adults should be free to fashion the terms
of their own relationships and rely on contract as the means of so doing, effectively replacing
the marital status with actual negotiation and bargaining building on the increased acceptance
of premarital agreements.").
275. See, e.g., LAW COMM'N OF CAN., supra note 15, at 122 ("Governments should attempt to
design their international arrangements on the basis of the existence of a variety of
relationships and move toward an international recognition of registrations.").
276. See James L. Musselman, What's Love Got to Do With It? A Proposal for Elevating the
Status of Marriage by Narrowing its Definition, While Universally Extending the Rights and Benefits
Enjoyed by Married Couples, 16 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 37, 74 (2009).
277. See, e.g., McClain, supra note 15, at 107-08.
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a more expansive role in the regulation of marriage. I conclude that
continued state regulation of marriage is critically important for
Commonwealth African women's rights within marriage. International
human rights law presumes a role for the state in the protection of women's
rights within marriage.278 Under human rights law, states enter into
treaties binding them to uphold the human rights provisions therein.279
African states have a crucial role to play in enhancing gender equality
within marriage; indeed, many are bound to do so under international
human rights law.280
At first blush, removal of the state from marriage regulation may
appear to promote a neutral, non-interventionist approach. Other
commentators claim that removal of the state from marriage regulation
simply promotes multiculturalism in pluralist states. Both arguments,
however, are flawed. Leaving customary and religious law to govern
family relations promotes a particular normative approach to governing the
family, one that facilitates rather than challenges women's subordination.
It is far from a neutral and innocuous approach.281 Similarly, it goes beyond
simply promoting multiculturalism. This approach of invalidating state
regulation of marriage in the name of multiculturalism sacrifices women's
equality within the family.282
B. Equality Within Relationships: The State's Role
1. Human Rights Framework
International human rights treaties such as CEDAW directly address
the state's role in promoting equality within marriage. 283 All of the
Commonwealth African countries have ratified CEDAW.284 Article 16 of
CEDAW requires States Parties to "take all appropriate measures to
eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage
and family relations" and specifically obligates states to take action in
278. CEDAW, supra note 16, arts. 2, 16.
279. See Rebecca J. Cook, State Responsibility for Violations of Women's Human Rights, 7
HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 125,147 (1994).
280. States that have ratified CEDAW without reservation to article 16 are bound to "take
all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relating to
marriage and family relations and in particular shall ensure, on a basis of equality of men and
women... ." CEDAW, supra note 16, art. 16.
281. Madhavi Sunder, Piercing the Veil, 112 YALE L. J. 1399, 1403-04 (2003) ("Just as we
'pierce the veil' of corporate sovereignty in cases of injustice or fraud, women activists are
asserting a right to confront oppressive laws and practices otherwise legally shielded in the
name of religion.").
282. See generally Ayelet Shachar, Religion, State, and the Problem of Gender: Newo Modes of
Citizenship and Governance in Diverse Societies, 50 MCGILL L.J. 49 (2005).
283. CEDAW, supra note 16, art. 16.
284. For a list of countries that have ratified CEDAW, see Status of Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION,
htt:/ /treaties.un.org/ Pages/ ViewDetails.aspx?src= TREATY&mtdsgfo= IV-
8 &chapter=4 &
langen (last visited Feb. 21, 2011).
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certain areas to promote equality within the family.285 International human
rights treaties have long recognized the state's interest in regulating
marriage.286 Several treaties require states to establish a minimum age for
marriage, thereby protecting a particularly vulnerable population from the
physical and emotional toll of early marriage.287 The same treaties also
require that states ensure that the parties enter into the marriage with " full
and free consent."288
Some states undermine Article 16's obligations to promote equality
within marriage by issuing reservations to the Article.-89 Although the
CEDAW Committee has made it clear that it considers reservations to
Article 16 contrary to the object and purpose of the treaty,290 such
reservations persist and hamper implementation of the treaty.291 None of
the Commonwealth African countries have entered reservations to Article
16 of CEDAW.292
Regional instruments such as the Protocol to the African Charter on
Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women ("the Protocol") also
provide protection against gender-based rights violations within the
family.293 Article 6 of the Protocol requires states to "ensure that women
and men enjoy equal rights and are regarded as equal partners in
marriage," including marriage requirements concerning consent, minimum
age, registration of marriages, choice of domicile, choice of name,
nationality, nationality and education of children, and property rights.294
285. CEDAW, supra note 16, art 16.
286. See generally Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and
Registration of Marriages, Dec. 10, 1962, 521 U.N.T.S. 231.
287. See, e.g., id. art. 2 ("States Parties to the present Convention shall take legislative action
to specify a minimum age for marriage.").
288. Id. art. 1 ("No marriage shall be legally entered into without the full and free consent
of both parties. . . .").
289. See Vedna Jivan & Christine Forster, What Would Gandhi Say? Reconciling Universalism,
Cultural Relativism and Feminism Through Women's Use of CEDAW, 9 SING. Y.B. INT'L L. 103,108
(2005).
290. See Yakar&Oule Jansen, The Right to Freely Have Sex? Beyond Biology: Reproductive
Rights and Sexual Self-Determination, 40 AKRON L. REv. 311, 323-24 (2007).
291. See Anne F. Bayefsky, General Approaches to the Domestic Application of Women's
International Human Rights Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTiVES 351, 352 (Rebecca J. Cook ed., 1994) ("Many of the substantive reservations are
wide ranging and profoundly affect the integrity of the Convention.").
292. For a complete list of reservations to CEDAW by country, see Declarations,
Reservations and Objections to CEDAW, U.N. Div. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF WOMEN,
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/reservations-country.htm (last visited Feb.
21,2011).
293. The following Commonwealth countries have ratified the Protocol: The Gambia,
Ghana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Seychelles, South Africa, Tanzania,
Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe (although Zimbabwe withdrew from the Commonwealth in
2003). Joseph Olanyo, Uganda: Country Ratifies Protocol on Afican Women Rights, ALLAFRICA
(Aug. 3, 2010), http://allafrica.com/stories/201008031178.html.
294. Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of
Women in Africa, art. 6, July 11, 2003, OAU Doc. CAB/ LEG/66.6 (entered into force Nov. 25,
2005), available at http://www.achpr.org/english/Jinfo/women en.htnd [hereinafter Protocol
on the Rights of Womeni.
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Since the early 1990s, international human rights instruments have
recognized the state's interest in prohibiting violence against women, both
inside and outside of marriage.295 Traditionally, international human rights
law focused on rights violations that occurred in the "public" sphere. 296
Violations of human rights that occurred in the home, or "private sphere,"
at the hands of private actors rather than representatives of the state, were
not subject to scrutiny under human rights law.297
Because international human rights law generally imposes obligations
on states rather than private actors, 298 scholars and activists struggled in the
1980s and early 1990s to expand the notion of state responsibility to include
violations against women in the so-called private sphere. 299 One such
scholar, Celina Romany, argued for condemning "a human rights
framework that construes the civil and political rights of individuals as
belonging to public life while neglecting to protect the infringements of
those rights in the private sphere of familial relationships." 300
Many of the international human rights instruments that were
promulgated in the early 1990s thus reflected an expanded understanding
of state responsibility that included the responsibility "to ensure the
prevention, investigation, and punishment" of gender-based human rights
violations that occurred in private as well as public realms.301 International
instruments such as the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against
Women (DEVAW) also prohibit states from invoking custom and tradition
as a justification for violence against women.302
Regional instruments, such as the Protocol on the Rights of Women in
Africa, also address violence against women. Article 4 of the Protocol
provides that states must take steps to "adopt . . . legislative,
administrative, social and economic measures as may be necessary to
ensure the prevention, punishment and eradication of all forms of violence
295. See generally U.N. Secretary-General, Ending Violence Against Women: From Words to
Action, U.N. Sales No. E/06/IV/8 (2006).
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. See, e.g., HILARY CHARLESWORTH & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE BOUNDARIES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW: A FEMINIST ANALYSIS 148 (2000).
299. See Johanna Bond, International Intersectionality: A Theoretical and Pragmatic Exploration
of Women's International Human Rights Violations, 52 EMORY L.J. 71, 88 (2003) (describing the
expansion of state responsibility to include private actors).
300. Celina Romany, State Responsibility Goes Private: A Feminist Critique of the Public/Private
Distinction in International Human Rights Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN, supra note 291, at
85.
301. See Radhika Coomaraswamy & Lisa M. Kois, Violence Against Women, in 1 WOMEN &
INT'L HUM. RTs. LAW 177, 178 (Kelly D. Askin & Dorean M. Koenig eds., 1999); see also
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, art. 4, U.N. GAOR, 3d Comm.,
48th Sess., Res. 48/104, U.N. Doc. A/48/629 (1994) ("States should pursue by all appropriate
means and without delay a policy of eliminating violence against women and, to this end,
should . . . exercise due diligence to prevent, investigate, and . . . punish acts of violence
against women, whether those acts are perpetrated by the State or by private persons." (emphasis
added)).
302. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, art. 4, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Comm., 48k" Sess., Res. 48/104, U.N. Doc. A/48/629 (1994).
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against women."303 The Protocol also requires ratifying states to "prohibit
and condemn all forms of harmful practices which negatively affect the
human rights of women."304 Although the Protocol explicitly values the
role of tradition and custom in women's lives, it does not allow custom to
excuse violence or harmful practices.305
2. History and Future of State Involvement in Marriage
For feminists, the state has historically been an inconsistent ally; it is
both the perpetrator of gender-based human rights violations and a
potential source of remedies for those violations.30 6 Although claiming that
the family is a private realm into which the state will not intercede, states
have routinely regulated family matters. 307 In exposing the flaws of the
public/private dichotomy, many feminists have noted that states
selectively intervene in family relations when it benefits the state to do so.3 08
Historically, colonial authorities and the indigenous male elites with
whom they colluded manipulated marriage using taxes and selective
criminal prosecution in ways that inspire skepticism toward state
regulation of marriage. Colonial authorities and many of the traditional
leaders who collaborated with them sought to manipulate indigenous
marriage for a variety of reasons. In Belgian Africa, for example, colonial
authorities sought to elevate the status of women by discouraging
polygamy.309 To this end, the colonial authorities imposed a "polygamy
tax" under which "men with more than one wife were obliged to pay a
supplementary tax for each wife beyond the first, from the second up to the
thirtieth."310  Belgian colonial authorities later came to regret "liberating"
women from polygamy, concluding that it was "better [to] keep women
under the customary authority of polygamists, . . . than [to] let them run
free and misguided into town and prostitution."311  Concern over
prostitution, in fact, led Belgian colonial authorities to impose a tax on
single urban women.312
303. Protocol on the Rights of Women, supra note 294, art. 4.
304. Id. art. 5.
305. Bond, Gender, Discourse, supra note 12 (describing in detail the potential impact of the
Protocol).
306. Romany, supra note 300, at 99-100.
307. Fineman, supra note 2, at 34 ("Reproduction clearly entails important societal interests
.... [Tihe state interest in children continues to be used to justify state regulatory interest in
the marital family.").
308. CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 298, at 57 (" [The state can devote some of its
powers to centres of authority in the private sphere that may have no concern with the
unequal position of women or indeed may have an interest in maintaining it, such as the
family... .").
309. Nancy Rose Hunt, Noise Over Camouflaged Polygamy, Colonial Morality Taxation and a




312. Id. at 56.
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British colonial authorities and traditional leaders within British
colonies also provided incentives to marry. In Ghana, for example,
between 1929 and 1933, traditional leaders ordered the arrest of unmarried
women over the age of fifteen.313 The traditional leaders in Asante aimed to
encourage conjugal marriages among our womenfolk" in part to combat
"women's growing uncontrollability."3 1 4 Colonial authorities and male
traditional leaders thus reinforced the view of marriage as a vehicle for
social control over women. Taxes and criminal law became mechanisms to
police the boundaries of marriage within the indigenous African
population.
Although the colonial state's history of marriage manipulation inspires
skepticism among many feminists (myself included), rejecting the state as a
potential agent of change is shortsighted. International and regional
human rights instruments contemplate, and even require, an active role for
the state in ensuring gender equality in marriage. With the expansion of
state responsibility for violence against women, the international trend is
toward greater state involvement in the promotion of equality within
marriages rather than less.315
Many feminists also recognize that the state itself is a perpetrator of
violence against women as well as a potential source of redress for
violations.316 Although some skepticism of the state is warranted on that
basis alone, minimizing or eliminating the state's role in marriage
regulation runs counter to the international human rights trend toward
greater state responsibility for non-discrimination and violence within the
so-called private domain of the family.
C. Equality Across Relationships: The State's Role
1. Human Rights Framework
United Nations institutions have been slow to recognize same-sex
couples' right to marry.317 Although human rights litigation may prove
313. Jean Allman, Rounding Up Spinsters: Gender Chaos and Unmarried Women in Colonial
Asante, in "WICKED" WOMEN AND THE RECONFIGURATION OF GENDER IN AFRICA, supra note 228,
at 130, 130.
314. Id. at 133 (noting that "the chiefs betrayed much concern about women's growing
uncontrollability, fondly recalling 'the good old days of our ancestors ... [when] no girl or
woman dared to resist when given away in marriage to a suitor by her parents or relatives as
is the case now.' (citation omitted)).
315. In fairness, proponents of eliminating marriage as a legal category would likely argue
that the state must continue to combat gender-based violence in the home through both civil
and criminal laws that do not depend, for their efficacy, on marriage as a status. This is true
for most civil protection order statutes in the United States, which extend to people in an
intimate, but not necessarily conjugal, relationship.
316. See, e.g., Coomaraswamy & Kois, supra note 301, at 178-79.
317. See Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, State Regulation of Sexuality in International Human Rights
Law and Theory, 50 WM. & MARY L. REv. 797, 862 (2008) (providing a comprehensive description
of the international response to rights related to sexual orientation).
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useful in compelling states to extend marriage rights to same-sex couples,
recent jurisprudence from the European Court of Human Rights suggests
that this outcome will take some time. In its June 24, 2010, judgment in
Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, the Court ruled that Austria was not obligated to
extend marriage rights to same-sex couples under Articles 8, 12, and 14 of
the European Convention.318 The Court suggested, however, that this
conclusion might change when a sufficient number of European states
recognized the right in their own domestic laws.319 Article 12 of the
Convention guarantees "men and women of marriageable age" the right to
marry, "according to the national laws governing the exercise of this
right." 320 Article 8 concerns the right to respect for private and family life,
and Article 14 prohibits discrimination in the enjoyment of the rights set
forth in the Convention.
A gay Austrian couple, Horst Michael Schalk and Johann Franz Kopf,
challenged the Austrian government's refusal to allow the couple to marry.
In its analysis of Article 12, which guarantees "men and women" the right
to marry, the Court noted that there is no consensus on same-sex marriage
among European states.321 Although it recognized that "the institution of
marriage has undergone major social change since the adoption of the
Convention,"322 the Court noted that national governments were in the best
position to assess the social and cultural meaning attached to marriage and
to evaluate the expansion of marriage to include same-sex couples in a
particular national context. 323 As a result, the Court held that Article 12
imposed no obligation on Austria to afford same-sex couples the right to
marry. In assessing the applicants' discrimination claims under Articles 8
and 14, the Court concluded that Austria's introduction of the Registered
Partnership Act militated against a finding of discrimination. 324
The Court did, however, appear to lay the foundation for a future
finding to the contrary.325 Notably, the Court observed that it "would no
longer consider that the right to marry enshrined in Article 12 must in all
circumstances be limited to marriage between two persons of the opposite
sex." 326 The Court implied that it would recognize a right to marry for
same-sex couples when a European consensus emerged on the issue.327
318. Schalk v. Austria, App. No. 30141/04, 11 46,58 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 24, 2010).
319. Id.; see also Clive Baldwin, The European Court's Hidden But Hopeful Message on Same-
Sex Marriage, THE GUARDIAN (June 29, 2010, 1:45 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/
2010/jun/29/europe-rules-same-sex-marriage-austria ("But for now the court has held back,
hinting strongly that it will recognize the right to same-sex marriage, as a right under the
convention, when a 'European consensus' exists . . . .").
320. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 12,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 234.
321. Schalk, App. No. 30141/04, 1 58.
322. Id.
323. Id. 1 1160-61.
324. Id. ] 102-06.
325. See Baldwin, supra note 319.
326. Schalk, App. No. 30141/04, 61.
327. See Baldwin, supra note 319.
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Some human rights organizations, in fact, suggest that Schalk represents an
important partial victory for champions of marriage rights for same-sex
couples. 328
Consensus concerning the familial rights of same-sex couples will
undoubtedly emerge more quickly in Europe than in Africa. Within Africa,
South Africa stands alone in its official recognition of human rights related
to sexual orientation.329 Robert Mugabe, President of Zimbabwe, has
openly displayed hostility and animus toward gays and lesbians in that
country.330 President Museveni of Uganda has similarly derided gays and
lesbians in public comments. 331 Rights groups have accused government
representatives in Zimbabwe, Namibia, Zambia, and Botswana, among
others, of state-sponsored homophobia. 332 In May 2010, the Malawian
government imprisoned two men that it accused of having a sexual
relationship.3 33 LGBT activists throughout the region report being targeted
for violence and harassment for their work on behalf of the LGBT
community.3 34
The value of the human rights framework extends beyond strategic
litigation. Human rights advocates will continue to use the human rights
framework for public education campaigns designed to raise awareness
about LGBT rights. These rights-based campaigns will, over time, increase
tolerance and lay the foundation for more open dialogue concerning
marriage rights for same-sex couples. Although this approach is
susceptible to charges of incrementalism, it is the most politically feasible
strategy given the reality of widespread, often officially sponsored
homophobia in the region.
Civil society and the state must couple human rights awareness
campaigns with long-term law reform efforts. These law reform efforts
should build upon the current plural legal system, expanding the diversity
of marriage options over time. When successful human rights advocacy
and political will eventually coalesce, marriage options may be expanded to
include marriage for same-sex couples in the region, as is the case in South
Africa.
328. See, e.g., id.
329. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 118, at 3 (distinguishing South Africa from the
Southern African region as a whole).
330. Mugabe has been openly homophobic since 1995, justifying "his intolerance with the
claim that homosexuality is 'un-African' [and] describing it as a disease 'coming from so-called
developed nations."' Id. at 1.
331. See Jonathan Clayton, Same-Sex Marriages Given Blessing by South Africa, THE TIMES,
Dec. 2, 2005, at 47 (quoting Museveni as saying, "Look for homosexuals, lock them up and
charge them.... God created Adam and Eve. I did not see God creating man and man.").
332. See, e.g., HUMAN RIHTS WATCH, supra note 118, at 2.
333. Barry Bearak, Gay Couple in Malawi Get Maximum Sentence of 14 Years in Prison, N.Y.
TIMES, May 21, 2010, at A6.
334. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 118.
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2. Levels of State Engagement
The state has an obligation to refrain from discrimination in the
promotion of marriage and its attendant benefits.335 Over the last decade,
activists and scholars have proposed a number of ways in which states
might achieve equal treatment of intimate relationships. Three approaches
have dominated the public discourse; each attempts to moderate state
regulation to varying degrees.
a) Civil Unions for Same-Sex Couples
First, a state might decide to create a new category of relationships,
such as civil partnerships. A state might create civil partnership status as a
complement to marriage, affording same-sex couples the opportunity to
register a civil partnership but not a marriage. 336 The merits of this
approach have been hotly debated in a number of countries.33 7 Opponents
argue convincingly that recognition through a type of "separate-but-equal"
scheme does little to combat the bias against same-sex partnerships.338
There is symbolic and expressive value in including same-sex unions
within the legislative definition of marriage. In the words of two South
African scholars who view civil partnerships as a poor substitute for
marriage, "Within a multi-cultural society such as South Africa, marriage
has diverse historical roots, a particular status, and a range of religious,
social, and spiritual meanings, with varying forms of concomitant
rituals."3 39 As a result, there is significant expressive value in placing same-
sex and opposite-sex unions on equal footing.
b) Elimination of Marriage as a Legal Status
Second, the state might remove itself from the marriage business
altogether. Such a system would abolish marriage as a legal category and
allow people to use contracts to define the parameters of their
335. For a thorough justification of this reasoning, see Nelson Tebbe & Deborah A. Widiss,
Equal Access and the Right to Marry, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1375, 1380 (2010).
336. See Pierre De Vos & Jaco Barnard, Same-Sex Marriage, Civil Unions and Domestic
Partnerships in South Africa: Critical Reflections on an Ongoing Saga, 4S. AFR. L.J. 795, 810 (2007).
337. See, e.g., Stephen Collins, Same-Sex Couples to Get Legal Recognition Next Year, IRISH
TIMES, Nov. 1, 2007, at 1; Adam Wagner, Has the Time Come for Gay Marriage in the UK?, THE
GUARDIAN (uly 21, 2010, 7:24 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2010/jul/21/gay-
mariage.
338. See De Vos & Barnard, supra note 336, at 811 (suggesting that in South Africa, "the
creation of an apartheid-style, separate 'civil partnership' for same-sex couples merely
confirmed that the law did not consider their relationships equal in status and worthy of equal
concern and respect").
339. David Bilchitz & Melanie Jud ge, For Whom Does the Bell Toll? The Challenges and
Possibilities of the Civil Union Act for Family Law in South Africa, 23 S. AFR. J. HUM. RIS. 466, 472
(2007).
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relationships.340 A handful of feminists and LGBT advocates in the global
North, including most notably Martha Fineman, have advanced this
approach. Those seeking to abolish marriage have argued that the
institution is so heavily plagued by sexism and heterosexism that it is
beyond redemption. 4
With its history of gender-based oppression, it is easy to see why some
scholars would like to dismantle the marriage institution in the United
States. The common law history of marriage in the United States
demonstrates the patriarchal nature of the institution. As Fineman notes,
the Reconstruction-era U.S. Supreme Court strictly defined the terms of the
marital relationship:
The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the
female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil
life. The constitution of the family organization, which is founded
in the divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of things, indicates
the domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain
and functions of womanhood.342
This view of marriage and women's roles within it led to the denial of
women's property and contract rights.343 In more recent times, courts have
relied on the sanctity of the institution of marriage to deny women legal
remedies when they have been the victims of domestic violence and marital
rape.344 "Seen through this lens, the virtues of doing away with marriage as
a legal category are clear: it would protect freedom of expression, intimate
association, and cultural pluralism while enhancing equality between and
within intimate associations." 345 Proponents also argue that eliminating
marriage as a legal status would promote equality for those in same-sex
relationships who are excluded from the institution in many parts of the
world.346
According to Fineman, " [w]ith the recognition of equality between
women and men, we assume parity in bargaining capacity on the part of
individuals entering these relationships and no longer see a need for the
340. See, e.g., Nastich, supra note 2, at 165-66.
341. See, e.g., Fineman, supra note 2, at 29.
342. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1873) (enforcing the legal doctrine of coverture by
holding that a state law preventing a woman from practicing law did not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment).
343. Amanda L. Stubson, Giving Victims a Voice: The Doctrine of Forfeiture by Wrongdoing as a
Remedy to the Silencing Effect of Crawford, 32 HAMUNE L. REV. 265, 290 (2009) ("Under
coverture, a married woman had no property rights, and could not contract, sue, or be sued
without the consent of her husband.").
344. See Nancy Kaymar Stafford, Permission for Domestic Violence: Marital Rape in Ghanaian
Marriage, 29 WOMEN's RTs. L. REP. 63, 64; Atinmo, supra note 152, at 82 ("Ultimately, women's
injuries from domestic abuse reflect the effects of aggressive masculinity, but society feels that
the sanctity of marriage is more important than a woman's physical safety.").
345. METZ, supra note 8, at 12.
346. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott, A World Without Marriage, 41 FAM. L.Q. 537, 540-41 (2007).
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protective intervention of the state."347 Fineman proposes that people
should regulate their own relationships through contract, noting that "[t]his
means that sexual affiliates (formerly labeled husband and wife) would be
regulated by the terms of their individualized agreements, with no special
rules governing fairness and no unique review or monitoring of the
negotiation process."MB Fineman anticipates that "ameliorating doctrines
would fill the void left by the abolition of this aspect of family law." 3 49
Assuming arguendo that Fineman's premise is true in the United States,
Commonwealth African women enjoy far less bargaining parity. In the
context of Commonwealth Africa, feminists are struggling to achieve
formal equality in many areas, making the assumption of bargaining parity
inapposite. In this context, wide-scale, individualized bargaining over the
rights and duties of intimate relationships as a substitute for state
sanctioned marriage would subject many women to the vagaries of
pronounced inequality in contract negotiation. Although formal,
systematized marriage disadvantages women within the region, contract
negotiations over marriage particularities would have a similar, or perhaps
more deleterious, effect.
Perhaps uncontroversially, Fineman's theory is a contextualized,
situated one. It is informed by local geographic and socioeconomic realities
and envisions a state that is both well-financed and well-functioning. It is
fundamentally concerned with the excesses and overreaching of a strong
state. In contrast, some states in Commonwealth Africa are weak states in
terms of human rights enforcement and general administrative functioning.
Central governments in the region lack the resources to provide the type of
benefits, such as childcare and health insurance, which would theoretically
facilitate implementation of Fineman's model.
Other scholars have cautioned about the potential influence of illiberal
proponents of deregulation. Linda McClain, for instance, describes how the
proposal to eliminate the state's role in the regulation of marriage has been
co-opted in the U.S. by conservative proponents of religious autonomy.350
Similarly, within Commonwealth Africa, customary and religious leaders
would likely welcome the opportunity to exercise exclusive jurisdiction
over marriage. It would be unreasonable and contrary to the spirit of
modern human rights jurisprudence, however, for the state to so abdicate
its responsibility over the promotion of gender equality within the family to
authorities with illiberal aims.351
347. Fineman, supra note 2, at 53.
348. MARTHA FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH 134 (2004).
349. Id. at 135.
350. See Linda McClain, Marriage Pluralism in the United States: On Civil and Religious
Jurisdiction and the Demands of Equal Citizenship 8 (Bos. Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No.
10-14, 2010), available at http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/scholarship/
workingpapers/2010.html.
351. See generally, Johanna E. Bond, Constitutional Exclusion and Gender in Commonwealth
Africa, 31 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 289 (2008).
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Fineman's very recent scholarship suggests that she too has become
wary of minimizing the role of the state because doing so privileges the
value of autonomy over equality. She notes that "[i]n recent years in
America the possibilities for a robust and expansive vision of equality seem
to have eroded, worn away by the ascendency of a narrow and
impoverished understanding of autonomy." 352 This may call for more state
intervention into the marriage institution: "If . . . we were to start our
discussions of what is the proper relationship between state and individual
with the primary objective being that of ensuring and enhancing a
meaningful equality of opportunity and access, we may see a need for a
more active and responsive state."353
Tamara Metz has also proposed dismantling marriage in favor of an
"intimate caregiving union status."354 Metz argues that current state
involvement with marriage is problematic on two primary grounds. First,
she is concerned with "the role the state assumes when it wields final
control over the public meaning and use of the marital label."355 Second,
she objects to the use of marriage as the vehicle through which the state
protects and supports caregiving.356
Yet Metz's first concern that the state is the sole authority for
establishing the parameters and beneficiaries of marriage, while true in the
United States, does not reflect the reality of the plural marriage systems in
Commonwealth Africa. Within these systems, in which statutory law
operates alongside customary and religious marriage law, the state plays a
less significant role as the moral authority governing marriage. Traditional
leaders and religious leaders play a role in facilitating and legitimizing non-
statutory marriage regimes, thereby denying the state a monopoly on
marriage.357 Traditional leaders have considerable leeway in defining and
rewarding marriage.358 I have argued elsewhere, in fact, that traditional
and religious leaders have too much authority to govern marriage, making
women vulnerable to oppression and discrimination within the marital
relationship. 35 9
352. Martha Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State 14 (2010)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1694740.
353. Id. at17.
354. METZ, supra note 8, at 114.
355. Id. at 115 (elaborating that "[wjhen government serves as the controlling public
authority vis-a-vis marriage, it assumes the role of ethical authority, a role for which it neither is
nor ought to be suited").
356. Id. at 128 (observing that "[wihen marital status is the primary avenue for the flow of
legal benefits, many families are left out or unduly disadvantaged").
357. See WOMEN & LAW IN S. AFR. RES. TRUST, IN SEARCH OF JUSTICE: WOMEN AND THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN MALAWI 20 (2000) ("Besides being involved in the contracting of
the marriage, the marriage counselors are also intended to mediate between the spouses in
cases of matrimonial trouble. Legally, the counselors are required and necessary by way of
formality in relation to customary law marriages.").
358. See Christine Mary Venter, The New South Afrcan Constitution: Facing the Challenges of
Wornen's Rights and Cultural Rights in Post-Apartheid South Africa, 21 J. LEGIS. 1, 3 (1995).
359. Bond, Gender, Discourse, supra note 12, at 559-60 (describing the extent of power that
local tribal leaders possess, and their reluctance to embrace efforts to protect women's fights).
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While Fineman and Metz's main arguments for marriage deregulation
appears to rely on a particular notion of strong statehood, other aspects of
their models may have more resonance in the African context. Metz's
second major concern relates to the state's use of marriage to determine
financial and other benefits of marriage. 360 Like Fineman, she contends that
marriage is a poor proxy for rewarding caretaking, and the task of defining
marriage distracts from important, broader policy goals. 361  Fineman
identifies the state's goals in marriage promotion and argues that those
goals would be more easily accomplished through targeted, functional
legislation. She asserts that the relationship between caregiver and
dependent should replace the gendered, spousal dyad as the focus of the
state's support within family law. 362 Commenting on Fineman's proposed
focus on caregivers and dependents, Mary Lyndon Shanley observes that
"[tjhe kinds of measures that would foster autonomy for adults and enable
them to provide for children in their care include health insurance,
affordable and quality child care, child allowances of the kind common in
Europe, flexible workplace hours, and paid parental leave for both men and
women."3 63 Fineman asserts that the state must first meet the needs of
dependents and their caregivers, and then adults can order their intimate
lives through contract.3M
Unlike concern about a state monopoly on marriage or assumptions
about women's unfettered ability to negotiate contracts, Fineman and
Metz's concerns surrounding caregiving have particular relevance to the
African region. Fineman and Metz both suggest that the state could more
directly serve the needs of caregivers by abandoning the use of marriage as
a proxy. Within Commonwealth Africa, caregiving networks have often
involved kinship ties that extend beyond the spousal dyad. The scourge of
HIV/AIDS has caused a devastating number of children to be orphaned,
complicating the landscape of family care.365 Grandparents and other
family members have attempted to fill the gap left by parental AIDS deaths.
The Commonwealth African state should recognize this diversity of
caregiving and look for ways to support caregivers that reach beyond the
marital relationship. Although Commonwealth African states have not
historically had the resources to directly support parental - or other -
360. METZ, supra note 8, at 128 ("When marital status is the primary avenue for the flow of
legal benefits, many families are left out or unduly disadvantaged.").
361. Id. ("The focus on marriage directs us toward the impossible task of defining marriage
and distracts us from the matter of real import - how the state can foster the public welfare
goals associated with intimate caregiving and stave off the potential inequalities that occur
within its folds.").
362. Fineman, supra note 2, at 30 ("1 argue that for all relevant and appropriate societal
purposes, we do not need marriage and we should abolish it as a legal category, transferring
the social and economic subsidies and privilege it now receives to a new family core
connection - that of the caretaker-dependent.").
363. Shanley, supra note 23, at 201.
364. See Fineman, supra note 2.
365. Todres, supra note 32, at 424 (noting that "[tlhe percentage of orphans in sub-Saharan
Africa whose parents died because of AIDS increased from 3.5% in 1990 to 32% in 2001.").
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caregivers, the increasing number of orphans in many countries will force
states to consider policies that directly or indirectly support a diversity of
caregivers.
The models proposed by Fineman, Metz, and others offer a compelling
alternative to marriage as we know it. The models promise to promote
equality by dismantling a historically patriarchal institution and attempting
to ensure the well-being of vulnerable dependents. Although in many
respects, the theory is inapplicable within the region, it offers important
insights into state support for diverse forms of caregiving, an issue that has
become increasingly relevant with the soaring number of parental AIDS
deaths in Commonwealth Africa.
c) Marriage for All
Third, the state could extend marriage rights to all. Although the
specific meanings and goals of marriage differ within communities and
among individuals, marriage has expressive power.366 Marriage sends a
cultural message, whether it is the private expression of love and
commitment between two people or the public recognition of new linkages
between two families. It is the expressive force of marriage that makes it
difficult to tinker with the institution. The same expressive force and
cultural meaning, however, suggests that the state has an opportunity to
promote equality by making the institution accessible to same-sex couples.
Although the "marriage for all" approach has the benefit of placing
same-sex and opposite-sex couples on equal footing, the approach fails to
challenge the sexist aspects of marriage as an institution. In response to this
concern, South Africa adopted a slightly modified approach to the
extension of marriage rights to all. In the 2006 Civil Union Act, the South
African Parliament created two categories of legally cognizable
relationships. 367  All couples, whether same-sex or opposite-sex, may
choose to solemnize their relationship as either a marriage or a civil
partnership.368 The Act, therefore, accomplishes dual objectives in that it
"serves both to widen the ambit of marriage to include same-sex couples
whilst de-centering marriage as the primary social form."369 Not only do
same-sex couples have the option to marry, but opposite-sex couples, who
may reject marriage and the traditional sex roles it signifies, may elect a
civil partnership.370
366. Fineman, supra note 2, at 37.
367. Bilchitz & Judge, supra note 339, at 479.
368. Id.
369. Id. at 476. There is, however, a conflict with the Marriage Act, which applies only to
heterosexual couples and which is still on the books in South Africa. Failure to repeal this law
upon passage of the Civil Union Act creates a troubling legal ambiguity. Id. at 487.
370. Id. at 486.
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IV. PROMOTING POSITIVE INTERVENTION BY THE STATE
A. Strategies for Promoting Equality Within Relationships:
Establishing a Legislative Floor for Marriage Rights
I advocate preserving the basic structure of the plural marriage system,
but I argue strongly for substantive changes to marriage law that apply
across legal systems. States should enact legislation that establishes a floor
for rights within marriage that applies whether the marriage was
contracted according to statutory, customary, or religious law. Tanzania's
Law of Marriage Act (LMA) provides an example of legislation that was
designed to promote gender equality within marriage when it was enacted
in 1971.371 The LMA partially integrated the plural marriage law system in
Tanzania by establishing statutory provisions that applied to all marriages
regardless of whether the marriage was contracted according to statutory,
customary, or religious law.
Tanzanian legal scholar Bart Rwezaura notes that one objective of the
LMA was "to improve the status of married women and provide greater
protection for children." 372 The LMA is limited in its reach and falls short
of equality promotion in several areas.373 For its time, however, it was a
progressive effort to standardize women's rights within marriage. "The
Law of Marriage Act of 1971, which was hailed as a milestone in integrating
personal laws and set Tanzania as a pioneer in Commonwealth Africa in
gender rights, gives women some civil rights in marriage and divorce."374
The LMA, for example, established a minimum age for marriage, although
the age differs for boys and girls.375 Significantly, the Act preserved the
plural legal system for marriage but imposed core requirements that apply
to all marriages and that were designed to improve the status of women
within marriage.
South Africa's recent Recognition of Customary Marriages Act also
seeks to apply certain statutory requirements to marriages contracted
according to customary law. 376  South African legal scholar Chuma
Himonga notes that one primary goal of the "reform of customary marriage
law was to bring this system of law in line with the Constitutional
provisions on equality and non-discrimination and to create an equitable
371. See infra note 372 and accompanying text.
372. Bart Rwezaura, Tanzania: Building a New Family Law Out of a Plural Legal System, 33 U.
LoUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 523, 526 (1995).
373. See Jennifer L. Rakstad, The Progress of Tanzanian Women in the Law: Women in Legal
Education, Legal Employment and Legal Reform, 10S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 35, 91 (2000).
374. GENDER AND LAW: EAST AFRICA SPEAKS 54 (Gita Gopal and Maryam Salim, eds. 1998)
(citation omitted).
375. CLARENCE KlPOBOTA AND SARAH LoUW, TANZANIA HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT 2008:
PROGRESS THROUGH HUMAN RIGHTS4 (2009).
376. See generally Penelope E. Andrews, " Big Love"? The Recognition of Customary Marriages
in South Africa, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1483 (2007).
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marital relationship for men and women."3m The Act officially recognizes
customary marriages and imposes requirements such as consent,
recognition of women's legal capacity, property rights for women in
marriage, and protection for women in the dissolution of marriage. 78
Among other things, "the Act has abolished the customary law method of
dissolving marriages out of court by the families of the spouses and by
other traditional institutions." 379
Tanzania and South Africa provide examples of important statutory
interventions into the realm of customary and religious marriage law.
Notably, neither statutory scheme attempts to abolish customary or
religious marriage. An abolitionist approach would surely fail given the
high rates of customary marriage in both countries. Abolition would also
fail to preserve the positive, non-discriminatory aspects of culture and
customary law.380 The legislative floor approach therefore attempts to
create a minimum standard for women's rights within marriage. It
preserves the option of marrying according to customary law or religious
law but stipulates specific ways in which such non-statutory marriages
must conform to gender equality standards. One commentator, Ann Estin,
has argued that courts and legislators should "allow individuals greater
freedom to express their cultural or religious identity and negotiate the
consequences of these commitments," while at the same time "protect[ing]
the rights of individuals to full membership and participation in the larger
political community."381 The legislative floor model attempts to mediate
these competing objectives in a way that is both pragmatic and achievable,
as well as protective of gender equality and cultural identity.
Applying the "rights floor" approach, a state would have a strong
justification for standardizing rights that pertain to bodily integrity. These
standards for physical safety within marriage would apply across marriage
systems. In other words, they would apply regardless of the type of
marriage into which a couple entered. In practice, this standardization
occurs through criminal laws prohibiting assault or family violence.
Explicit recognition of these rights within the marriage law, however, might
encourage prosecution and enforcement. The state would also be justified
in providing civil remedies for intimate violence, regardless of the type of
marriage into which a couple had entered.
Similarly, the state would be justified in standardizing, or integrating,
financial rights within marriage and at its dissolution. The state, for
example, could dictate property rights at divorce and apply those universal
standards to civil, customary, and religious marriages. South Africa's
Registration of Customary Marriages Act applies a statutory property
377. Himonga, supra note 11, at 263.
378. Id. at 264-66.
379. Jd. at 266.
380. See Bond, Gender, Discourse, supra note 12.
381. Ann Laquer Estin, Embracing Tradition: Pluralism in American Family Law, 63 MD. L.
REV. 540, 542 (2004).
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rights standard to customary marriages. 382 The state could also standardize
women's rights to inheritance, which vary significantly across countries
and across marital systems. Although Tanzania integrated much of its
marriage law through the LMA, it failed to standardize inheritance rights.
Ghana, in contrast, has not integrated its marriage laws, 383 but it passed a
uniform intestate succession law in 1985.384 Human rights activists and
others in Tanzania, including the Tanzanian Law Reform Commission,
have pressed for an integrated intestate succession law similar to
Ghana's. 385 Parliament, however, has yet to enact an integrated inheritance
law.
Finally, states would also have compelling reasons to impose some
standard requirements on the entry into and exit from marriage. Here, the
state is justified in regulating minimum age and voluntariness
requirements for marriage. As with the other categories of rights, standard
requirements for eligibility to marry would apply across marriage systems.
Within this last category of rights, however, communities would be free to
establish other requirements for a valid customary or religious marriage as
long as those requirements did not infringe on gender equality rights.
B. Strategies for Promoting Equality Across Relationships: Increase
Marriage "Menu" Options
The normative value of marriage is deeply entrenched in much of
Commonwealth Africa. As a result, proposals to eliminate marriage as a
legal status, which have arisen primarily in the global North, will have little
purchase in contemporary Commonwealth Africa. Eliminating a statutory
or civil law marriage option would simply result in an increase of
customary or religious marriages, where illiberal norms sometimes function
to subordinate women. I argue that rather than narrow the marriage
options, the state should take the lead in increasing and eventually
diversifying the available options.
The "menu" approach to marriage, in which couples may choose
among a number of categories to solemnize their relationship, makes sense
both as good policy and as a viable regional approach. In the plural legal
382. See supra notes 377-79 and accompanying text.
383. In Ghana in 1963, "a Bill on Uniform Marriage, Divorce and Inheritance rules was
published but never enacted." Wanitzek, supra note 260, at 77.
384. Gordon R. Woodman, Ghana Reforms the Law of Intestate Succession, 29 J. AFR. L. 118,
118 (1985); see also, Kuenyehia, supra note 121, at 396. But see Fenrich & Higgins, supra note 5, at
295-340 (noting significant implementation problems with Ghana's intestate succession law).
385. LAW REFORM COMM'N OF TANZ., REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE LAW OF
SUCCESSION/INHERITANCE 84 (1995) ("A uniform law of Succession/Inheritance should be
enacted in Tanzania, such a law should be moderated on the constitutional principles and
guarantees to such an extent that it will recognize existing tribal, customary and religious
differences but at the same time moderating those practices and procedures in the various
tribal, religious and customary laws which are inconsistent with principles of justice and
equity.").
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systems of Commonwealth Africa, couples generally choose to be married
under statutory, customary, or religious law. In this sense, the menu
approach already exists. Over time, as human rights advocacy facilitates
acceptance of marital equality, the menu could be expanded to include
other options such as civil partnerships or same-sex marriage.
South Africa provides a blueprint for other countries in the region that
achieve sufficient political momentum to expand the marriage menu
options for same-sex couples. South Africa's Civil Union Act opens up
marriage to same-sex couples at the same time that it provides a civil
partnership option for anyone who objects to marriage based on its sexist
and heterosexist history.386 As David Bilchitz and Melanie Judge remark:
[T]he achievement of the Civil Union Act is not that it guarantees
any particular social result but rather that it opens up the space for
two important goals to be achieved: first, the recognition of the
equal status of lesbian and gay relationships; and secondly, the
potential de-centering of marriage and the according of respect and
recognition to a diverse range of familial forms.38 7
Human rights advocates outside of South Africa have begun to lay the
foundation for broader acceptance of same-sex marriage, and for LGBT
rights more generally. Although acknowledging the public attacks on
LGBT communities in the region by national political leaders in Swaziland,
Namibia, Kenya, Zambia, and Uganda,388 Marc Epprecht cautions against
overstating the extent of homophobia within the region. Epprecht observes
that in Commonwealth Africa, "blanket denunciations of state-sanctioned
homophobia obscure some sophisticated cultural mechanisms that mitigate
the impact of homophobic rhetoric, as well as some remarkable successes in
achieving gay rights."389
Neville Hoad describes how anti-gay and nationalistic rhetoric combine
to limit LGBT rights in the region.390  "Certain strands of African
nationalism are explicit in their rejection of lesbian and gay citizenship
rights . . . . This rejection is frequently legitimized as a defense of national,
but more particularly racial, authenticity." 391 However, Hoad notes that
some LGBT organizations in the region "have attempted to reclaim
'anthropological' traditions of African sexualities that are appropriable
under the sign 'homosexuality." 392 He suggests that these groups have
386. Bilchitz & Judge, supra note 339, at 468.
387. id. at 468.
388. MARC EPPREcHT, HUNGOCHANI: THE HISTORY OF A DISSIDENT SEXUALITY IN SOUTHERN
AFRICA 4 (2004).
389. Id. at 6.
390. NEVILLE HOAD, AFRICAN INTIMACIES: RACE, HUMUSEXUALITY, AND GLOBALIZATION 75
(2006).
391. Id. at 75.
392. Id.
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argued that homophobia, rather than homosexuality, is the "corrupting
Western import."393 According to this view, "the entrenchment of human
rights discourse through at least fifty years of anti-apartheid nationalist
struggle is firmly on the side of lesbian and gay South Africans." 394 Indeed,
throughout the region, national advocacy groups, sometimes with the help
of international organizations, are beginning to make incremental progress
toward recognition of LGBT rights. This awareness-raising and human
rights advocacy may, over time, create enough momentum in the region to
expand marriage menu options to include marriage or civil partnerships for
the LGBT population beyond South Africa, the regional leader in this area.
C. Resonant Custom as a Vehicle for Promoting Equality Norms
Commentators must resist the popular and overly simplistic view that
characterizes marital relationships in Commonwealth Africa as regressive
and those in the West as progressive. Although several important
contemporary political leaders in the Commonwealth remain openly hostile
to state recognition of the rights of same-sex individuals and resistant to the
aggressive promotion of women's rights within marriage, scholars and
activists must interrogate customary law and practice to expose the ways in
which tradition may actually support the re-envisioning of familial roles and
responsibilities.
Despite the hurdles concerning social acceptance of gay and lesbian
relationships, several features of family life in Commonwealth Africa may,
in fact, lend support to eventual broadening of the marriage category. As
discussed above, marriage in Commonwealth Africa has historically
focused less on the relationship of two individual spouses.395 Instead,
marriage marks the linkages between two families.396 Proposals advocating
for state recognition of a range of relationships beyond conjugality,
however, may ultimately resonate with some Commonwealth African
cultural traditions that de-emphasize the conjugal relationship as the center
of family life.
In addition, unconventional relationships in the region - both conjugal
and non-conjugal - often developed as a response to social, cultural, and
economic conditions. 397 William Eskridge, for example, describes the
393. Id. (quoting one LGBT organization as stating that "[t]he minds of many of our
Southern African political leaders remain thoroughly colonized by Victorian dogma which
they now have the audacity to claim is the backbone of our African cultural heritage").
394. Id. at 79-80.
395. Bdlair, supra note 35, at 568.
396. See, e.g., Adjetey, supra note 34, at 1355.
397. See, e.g., Megan Vaughan, Problems in the Reconstruction of the History of the Family as an
Economic & Cultural Unit, in READINGS IN GENDER IN AFRICA, supra note 309, at 119, 122
("[C~hinjira in Southern Malawi, a relationship between two women formed independently of
their respective families, tells us something about the effects of large-scale, long-term economic
and social change .. .. It can be seen as a response not only to the constraints of 'kinship' .. .
but also as a response to very new economic circumstances and different levels of
[Vol. 1456
HeinOnline  -- 14 Yale Hum. Rts. & Dev. L.J. 56 2011
Culture, Dissent, and the State
experience of a nineteenth century Nigerian woman of the Igbo ethnic
group, who accumulated enough wealth to become a female husband to
nine other women.398 Female sex workers in colonial-era Nairobi,
developed pseudo-familial relationships designed to protect them
financially. 399 At times, sex workers did this by developing relationships of
"'blood brotherhood' (undugu wa kuchanjana). . . . What usually happened
was that a man and a woman came to an arrangement whereby afterwards
they helped each other as brother and sister." 400 Other women in Nairobi,
many of whom had accumulated property but had no children, adopted
"woman to woman" marriages "to ensure heirs to inherit their wealth." 401
In many cases, the motivation for this coupling was to keep property in the
patrilineal line.402
Caretaking of children in Commonwealth Africa often involves
extended family members.403 This accepted caretaking role for extended
family members might make it easier for Commonwealth African states to
recognize and value caretaking that goes beyond the marital relationship.
With limited governmental resources in many of these countries, however,
states are unlikely to provide financial incentives or otherwise compensate
those extended family members for their role in caretaking.
Reform efforts that seek to establish connections between custom and
proposed reforms are more likely to succeed than those that are perceived
to be imports from the West. Aspects of customary law support a broader
understanding of family, one that de-centers the spousal dyad. Rights
activists must frame the discourse about reform around those areas of
resonance.
CONCLUSION
The choice of an intimate partner is central to individual identity.
Although states have historically limited legal recognition of intimate
partners to opposite-sex marriage partners, there is a global shift toward
recognition of a diversity of intimate relationships. Where states have been
reluctant to acknowledge this shift, activists have called into question the
state's role in the regulation of intimate relationships.
I seek to geographically limit the application of this critique of the
state's role in marriage regulation. I advocate for the preservation of the
stratification.").
398. Eskridge, supra note 17, at 1419-20.
399. See Janet M. Bujra, Women 'Entrepreneurs' of Early Nairobi, in READINGS IN GENDER IN
AFRICA, supra note 309, at 123, 129.
400. Id.
401. Id. at 130.
402. Id.
403. See Bonthuys & Erlank, supra note 267, at 75 ("Many African children do not live with
their parents, but with grandparents or other family members. Where parents are in full-time
employment and do not have money to pay for day-care, children are often left in the care of
relatives or neighbors, or even other children.").
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state's regulatory role in marriage in Commonwealth Africa for several
reasons. First, the state has an obligation to promote equality within
individual relationships. Within plural legal systems, removing the state
from marriage regulation and thereby eliminating the civil marriage option
would cede control over marriage to local communities. Because
customary marriage law often discriminates against women, the absence of
a statutory alternative harms women. Given the continued purchase of
customary law in the region, states should thus retain the structure of the
plural legal system and establish a statutory core of marriage rights that is
applicable across all prevailing marriage regimes.
Second, the state must promote equality among intimate relationships,
including same-sex relationships. Because the political climate in
Commonwealth Africa remains largely hostile to the rights of the LGBT
community, reform must be incremental. The plural legal system in most
Commonwealth African countries allows couples to choose statutory,
customary, and in some cases, religious law as the governing marriage law.
This "menu" approach lends itself to a diversity of marriage options. States
should build on the architecture of the plural legal system to increase
"menu" options over time, including marriage options for same-sex
couples.
Finally, the state should explore ways in which marriage reform reflects
or builds upon existing value systems. Within the region, extended family
systems have traditionally tended to de-center the spousal dyad.
Moreover, the tragedy of HIV/AIDS deaths has required that extended
family take on even greater care-taking roles within the family.
Historically, individuals have entered into non-traditional relationships,
some of them same-sex, for a variety of economic and social reasons. States
and civil society should explore the areas of resonance between custom and
reform efforts.
Marriage is a rapidly evolving global concept. Events of the last few
months and years demonstrate that the definition of marriage is dynamic.
As demonstrated by the example of Commonwealth Africa, theoretical
critiques that call for a diminution or elimination of the role of the state in
regulating marriage must be understood as context-specific. In much of the
world, the state continues to have a vital role to play in promoting equality
within and among relationships.
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